



FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

Daily Report—

Supplement

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release
Distribution: Unlimited

East Europe

19980120 140

JPRS-EER-93-003-S
Wednesday
3 February 1993

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

NOTICE TO READERS

This publication was formerly called the JPRS EAST EUROPE REPORT. The FBIS DAILY REPORT SUPPLEMENT EAST EUROPE REPORT should reach subscribers noticeably faster than did the JPRS report. If you wish to subscribe to the FBIS DAILY REPORT SUPPLEMENT EAST EUROPE, please follow the procedures found on the back cover of this report.

East Europe SUPPLEMENT

JPRS-EER-93-003-S

CONTENTS

3 February 1993

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

* Future of Czech-Russian Relations Examined	<i>[Prague LIDOVE NOVINY 17 Dec]</i>	1
--	--------------------------------------	---

CZECH REPUBLIC

* Causes of Federation's Division Examined	<i>[TELEGRAF 24 Dec]</i>	2
* Archbishop Vlk Comments on Country's Division	<i>[CESKY DENIK 24 Dec]</i>	3
* Examination of Sudeten German Issue	<i>[LIDOVE NOVINY 22 Dec]</i>	4
* Privatized Press Distribution Seen as Monopoly	<i>[CESKY DENIK 24 Dec]</i>	5

HUNGARY

* European Unity, Integration, EC Discussed	<i>[TOZSDE KURIR 17 Dec]</i>	6
* Opposition Leaders View Closer Cooperation	<i>[168 ORA 22 Dec]</i>	7
* Candidates for Prime Minister in 1994 Discussed	<i>[168 ORA 22 Dec]</i>	9
* Former State Secretary Views Economic Laws	<i>[FIGYELO 23 Dec]</i>	11

POLAND

* Suchocka Opines on Coalition, Abortion, Economy	<i>[WPROST 20-27 Dec]</i>	13
* WPROST Names Suchocka 'Person of the Year'	<i>[WPROST 3 Jan]</i>	14
* Polish Satellite TV Reviewed, Updated	<i>[RZECZPOSPOLITA 2-3 Jan]</i>	16

ROMANIA

* Borbely on Autonomy, Relations With Opposition	<i>[Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG 23 Dec]</i>	18
--	--	----

SLOVAKIA

* Principles of Slovak Citizenship Law Revealed	<i>[PRAVDA 18 Dec]</i>	19
* Ignac Behul on His Committee's Tasks, Activities	<i>[PRAVDA 18 Dec]</i>	19
* Unity of Hungarians in Slovakia Seen Increasing	<i>[Budapest MAGYAR FORUM 17 Dec]</i>	20
* Minac's TV Eulogy of Dubcek Criticized	<i>[KULTURNY ZIVOT 25 Nov]</i>	21

YUGOSLAVIA

Macedonia

* Macedonian Church Official on SPC 'Provocation'	<i>[VECER 19-20 Dec]</i>	23
Black Market, 'Weapons Cult' in Macedonia	<i>[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 19 Dec]</i>	24
* Medicinal Drug Crisis in Macedonia Discussed	<i>[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 19 Dec]</i>	26

Vojvodina

* 'Three-Tiered Autonomy' in Vojvodina Urged	<i>[Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG 21 Dec]</i>	28
--	--	----

* Future of Czech-Russian Relations Examined

93CH0250A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
17 Dec 92 p 5

[Article by Jiri Valenta and Radek Chalupa of the Institute for International Relations: "Czech Diplomatic Policy Must Not Forget Eastern Politics; We Must Not Lose Sight of Russia"]

[Text] With the beginning of 1993, the Czech Republic will move further into Europe geopolitically. The foreign policy of the nascent state will concentrate more than ever before on the member countries of the European Common Market and on the United States. Therefore, it seems that there is nothing to stop Czech diplomatic policy from forgetting about the crisis in Russia, where Boris Yeltsin is defending the rudiments of democracy. However, that would be an irreparable mistake.

Although the Czech Republic will be separated from Russia by Ukraine and Slovakia, it would be foolish to rejoice at a geopolitical situation that has been created in that way. After all, any crisis that develops beyond Slovakia's eastern borders will, within a short time, inevitably spread to Czech territory. This concerns not only the feared waves of refugees but also the danger issuing from the loss of control over nuclear arms and nuclear power plants. The consequences would certainly not respect state borders.

Western democracies, spurred on by these fears, are attempting to retain the ability to influence the development on the territory of the former Soviet Union and to guide that development toward democracy and a market economy. Possibly as a result of these actions, it seems that, from the point of view of potential conflicts, one can name the unresolved issue of Kaliningrad, the intense problem of nationality in Moldavia (due to attempts to reunite with Romania), and the so far uncompleted withdrawal of troops from the Baltic and Germany. Equally, the problem of Russian minorities in the former Soviet Union republics, especially in the Baltic region, will cause major difficulties. The controversial statement made by the Russian minister of foreign affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, at a meeting of the CSCE ministers of foreign affairs in Stockholm, gives a hint of the extent of the power conflict that has begun in Russia. The policies of the Russian Government toward the Baltic and the former Yugoslavia has in the past already been a source of conflict between democratic forces and the conservatively inclined nationalist opposition. However, the circumstances surrounding the speech brought to mind the situation in December 1990, when Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister at that time, warned against the danger of a coup d'état (which did, in fact, take place some months later). Thus, we should consider the Stockholm speech to be a similar warning—but at the twelfth hour. Therefore, at this time, it is the world's duty to support Yeltsin and to help stabilize Russia. Recently, some U.S. politicians put

forth the idea that European security organizations should expand to include not only the countries of Central Europe but later, possibly, Russia, too. This would allow Russia to play the role of a strategic ally of the United States. (Andrei Kozyrev also supports the idea.)

What can the Czech Republic do in this situation? From the point of view of security, the new state can practically be "threatened" only by the fact that supplies of oil and natural gas would be unexpectedly interrupted. (In 1991, supplies to the CSFR from the former USSR made up, so to speak, 90 percent of the total oil import—9.4 million tons). One solution to the situation would be to put the oil pipeline from Ingolstadt in Germany into operation. However, regardless of that, it would still be advantageous for us to continue to import oil from Russia (after import has been diversified). This, by the way, is yet another reason it would be beneficial to maintain friendly relations with Slovakia and Ukraine because the pipeline crosses their territories. At the same time, we should not hesitate to make direct contact with the Tyumen region (including the consideration of options for direct investment).

A further—unfortunately, already real—problem is the spread of organized crime from the east, including drug trafficking and smuggling, prostitution, white-slave trade, organized gambling, and the laundering of dirty money from the territory of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. This is confirmed by information coming from a recent meeting between the leaders of Cosa Nostra and representatives of Mafia families from the former Soviet Union in Prague. In this case, intervention should be coordinated with other interested countries, with the proviso that one would concentrate on remedying the causes—a disastrous economic and social situation in the territory of CIS.

Czech democrats, beginning with Masaryk, understood that Russia cannot be isolated from Europe. The appropriate path, corresponding to this trend, is to support the democratization of Russia. This is particularly relevant at this time. Former Russian dissidents quite rightly complain that Czechoslovakia is not giving them the same amount of attention they themselves once gave Vaclav Havel, when he was being persecuted. Underestimating this factor was one of the mistakes made by the departing federal diplomacy.

Regardless of this, concrete results were attained in at least some spheres. With the help of Russian democratic forces, headed by Boris Yeltsin, and with the involvement of the Russian ambassador in Prague, Alexander Lebedev, and our ambassador in Moscow, Rudolf Slansky, the Commission of Czechoslovak Historians succeeded in obtaining many secret documents that elucidated the development from 1967 to 1970, including the so-called letters of invitation. After the New Year, the Czech Republic, like other democratic countries, should primarily concentrate on supporting the democratic forces in CIS, particularly in Russia and Ukraine.

*** Causes of Federation's Division Examined**

93CH0251B Prague TELEGRAF in Czech 24 Dec 92
p 3

[Editorial by Peter Schutz: "Statehood Is Being Born Out of Lies"]

[Text] We are separated from 1 January only by a few more days, only by several tens of hours—1 January, which will become an epoch-making milestone for all citizens of our former federal state. Precisely at midnight, with the advent of the new year, two independent states will come into being on the wreckage of Czechoslovakia. No matter what our individual relationship with this fact may be, there should at least be a minimum consensus regarding the fact that it is not possible to fill the birth certificates of the newly arising state units with misleading and false content. And, therefore, it is inevitable—and I am now speaking primarily about Slovakia—that we recall several undeniable facts. I consider this to be important because, even the testimony and evaluations of the so-called democratically relatively objective local media and politicians, or those striving to be objective, are downright "weed-infested" by an entire series of untruths, errors, and mystifications that are either deliberate or based in ignorance.

It is primarily a grossly misleading claim that the division of the state was agreed upon by two parties who did not have a mandate to make such a decision and that the citizenry was excluded. The entire responsibility for the breakup of Czechoslovakia lies fully at the feet of Vladimir Meciar, his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], and, naturally, those who voted for him. The quartet of Meciar, Knazko, Huska, and Kovac already arrived at the first meeting of the Republic election victors held in Brno with an unequivocal demand for the international legal subjectivity of Slovakia, which, translated into intelligible language, meant nothing other than complete independence. The Klaus counterproposal for a "loose" federation, which would operate at the very edge of what could still be called a joint state, was thus swept from the table even before it was able to get there, and the subsequent course of constitutional matters took the only possible turn—complete division. Meciar's statement of several weeks ago that, at one time, the HZDS was open to even other solutions is a common lie. Here it is perhaps still necessary to reiterate what has been stated a hundred times—namely, that a confederation or even a union is not a common state. That is why not even Zeman's well-timed Maastricht discussion, which virtually torpedoed the quiet process of division, was not an alternative.

The ODS [Civic Democratic Party] simply had no choice. In that light, even the contention by Jan Carnogursky that, on the Czech side, there was a certain so-called indirect intent is also thoroughly misleading. That is an unsubstantiated impression that could arise on the basis of the fundamentally only possible rational conduct on the part of the ODS after everything had been already decided. On the contrary, it was precisely Vaclav Klaus who, as the only Czech politician actively engaged in the elections even in Slovakia, as long as a year ago pushed through the final federal budget

in the face of strong opposition even in his own party, a budget based on the principle of civic solidarity—in other words, the redistribution of resources in favor of Slovakia, in opposition to the principle "Everyone for himself."

The polemic as to whether the HZDS or the ODS did or did not have a mandate for their steps is purely academic in view of the impossibility of continued coexistence of the Republics in a single state and leads nowhere. It is true that many decisions on delimiting the federal organs and institutions preceded the law on the demise of federation. The Federal Assembly, however, always had the opportunity of halting this process at any time and expressing its lack of confidence in the government. It did not do so.

Another kind of camouflage is the permanently occurring nonsense that the HZDS did not have the division of the state in its election program. It did. On the part of the voter, that required only the correct reading and deciphering of the HZDS program. It included steps that were identical, to the letter, with the constitutional program espoused by the Slovak National Party [SNS]. Sovereignty, constitution, international legal subjectivity. The entire difference consisted of only the final point, the referendum, which, in the end, could understandably not come about anyway. V. Meciar is possibly guilty of many things but certainly not of fooling the voters in this matter. The voter—he who truly did not wish to have such a New Year's Eve—fooled himself by his unwillingness or laziness to penetrate deeper into the problem. He proved unable to see that Meciar and Prokes were concerned for the same thing, but that one of them was substantially more crafty about it. The objection that Meciar wanted to use the direct-line move to achieve independence only to blackmail the Czech side and to "kick it" into some kind of confederation is already something completely different and does not diminish by one iota the responsibility borne by the Slovak electorate.

The claim that the citizen was sidelined onto a side track because he had no opportunity to express himself in a referendum is, thus, a mystification. The voter expressed himself in June. But let us admit for a moment that he truly did not understand the way things were moving and that things were passing him by. Let us also admit that the constitutional platform is only one of several components of the election program. Let us even admit that, in such a fundamental matter, it would be correct for the citizenry to get the opportunity to make amends. But the fundamental condition for the announcement of every referendum must be the expectation that it can decide about something at all.

But the referendum on the constitutional arrangement was no longer able to solve anything. At the very least, for two reasons. First, the jurisdictional law of December 1990 so paralyzed the central state power that its functioning could be further assured only with the collaboration of the national governments, which, thanks to the jurisdictions acquired, could thoroughly paralyze the federal power through mutual countermovements. And a state can, after all, not stand and fall on the basis of the compatibility of the Republic representations—particularly not a state in the midst of economic transformation.

Second, no results of a referendum nor any other force would compel Meciar to give up the mandate that was truly granted him for a period of four years, nor could he be compelled to revise his program. In the end, but not for the last time, the referendum is no culminating manifestation of democracy, as it is frequently and erroneously considered to be in our parts of the world. It is only one of democracy's applicable forms and only if it proves able to provide an unequivocal answer to an unequivocally posed question.

This brief overview of nation-stupefying errors can understandably not be complete, by far, and others would be well worthwhile. If the nascent statehood is to begin being imbued with positive content, it is not permissible to build it on the designs of fraud and lies. Slovak citizens chose an independent state, and they should have it, complete with all of the consequences in which it will result. The Slovak citizen is an adult, is of full age and mental capacity, and is fully responsible for his choice. Anyone who attempts to liberate him from the burden of his free choice is acting against his innermost interests. Freedom, be it ever so lightly and easily acquired, is a coin, the obverse side of which is responsibility. And this responsibility for his own actions must be borne by everyone for himself. If, in the final analysis, we do not learn this ever, then we can only dream the never-fulfillable dream of a civic society.

*** Archbishop Vlk Comments on Country's Division**

93CH0250B Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech
24 Dec 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Archbishop Miloslav Vlk by Stanislav Knenicky and Michal Musil; place and date not given: "Leave Behind Our Egotism"]

[Text] [CESKY DENIK] Christmas is the symbol of love and peace. What does this holiday mean to you as the highest representative of the Catholic Church in the Czech lands?

[Vlk] Most people interpret all holidays, including Christmas (which is the most significant holiday for them), as a remembrance of the past, the commemoration of the fact that Christ was born 2,000 years ago. But, for me, this holiday is always a new stimulus to experience the realities that such a holiday brings with it. The Christmas holiday is a symbol of love and peace. People usually feel the idyllic quality of Christmas very strongly, a time when people have a positive attitude toward one another or, let us say, an attitude of love, a piece of heaven, an oasis of peace and contentment. However, it is not only through idyllic quality but also through mutual experience that this piece of heaven with this attitude of love is created. I would like us to continue the experiences we have at Christmas in the new year and to leave behind our egotism, our insular close-mindedness, and show consideration for others, too. For me as a Christian, Christmas does not mean only humanism but also the coming of Christ, who brought man a gift—God's love. For me, it is the source of strength for such attitudes. That is the practical principle of Christianity. And I base my

attitude on what Christ said and taught. I want to relive it profoundly during Christmas and to realize again that it is the truth.

[CESKY DENIK] At Christmas people exchange gifts. The citizens of the Czech Republic will receive a gift for the new year. That gift is the Czech state. What do you think about that gift?

[Vlk] Can one call it a gift? Yes, in a sense one can. It is the result of the constitutional development of the past three years. The church, the bishops, and believers are more likely to be open to universalism. The church to which I belong, basically, is supposed to be the same in Austria, Germany, and Poland; it should be open to everyone and should not enclose itself within the borders of a specific nation. On the other hand, the church takes on a specific character, which demonstrates the national character, in every country.

If we are inclined toward universalism, we feel closer to unifying peoples and states than to dividing them. But, at the same time, we must recognize the right of every nation to self-determination. In my office as a representative of the Roman Catholic Church, I cannot, in principle, oppose the right of any nation to self-determination. I may regard it with more or less favorable feelings, but, simultaneously, I must recognize the realities of this development. At the same time, I am convinced that the separation of two nations can also bring positive elements because both nations, the Czechs and the Slovaks, who felt like a younger brother before the separation, will feel more equal.

[CESKY DENIK] The Czech state is being revived: Its patron saint has always been St. Wenceslaus, and today the idea of his being its patron is again being discussed. What connection does St. Wenceslaus and Christianity as a whole have with the present revival of the state?

[Vlk] As is well known, the chorale of St. Wenceslaus has been the Czech nation's anthem for several centuries. St. Wenceslaus, as a prince whose blood was spilled at the inception of our country, was considered to be an heir, the main patron who gave a special character to the state. In other words, Christianity was the foundation for the morals and values in past centuries. I see this prince playing the same role today. The legacy, which for centuries formed the support for this state, can also be the basis for today's economic and political development.

[CESKY DENIK] In the new year, our citizens will be faced with a relatively complex situation: A new tax system will be introduced, the privatization of large state enterprises will continue, and there will be bankruptcies. What would you wish for the people and their government, the Government of the Czech Republic?

[Vlk] I would wish that, during the process of privatization, attention be given to more than just the economic good; the social aspect, respect for others, should also be dealt with. I would wish that the individual would not have to pay too dearly for the economic recovery. The economy should be beneficial to society, which is certainly the purpose of the

privatization and other objectives. This aspect clearly issues from the most recent social encyclical published by the present pope.

[CESKY DENIK] Our present development is really a return to a specific system of values, which was eradicated by an authoritarian regime. We assume that Christianity will play a significant role in reviving these values. However, relations between the Catholic Church and the Czechoslovak Republic were conflict-ridden. Do you believe that relations between the church and the Czech Republic will be better and more balanced?

[Vlk] I believe that relations between the church and the Czechoslovak Republic evolved from the general atmosphere that was created after World War I by the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This atmosphere quieted down after the Concordat, which was concluded at the end of the 1920's. Mutual relations were proper and correct on the basis of this Concordat, although the atmosphere of mutual cooperation was not what it should have been. Now, after a period of communism, it seems to me that these relations—the relations between the state and the church—have matured. Many sharp edges that used to exist were blunted by our experiences under communism. People feel that the values brought by Christianity are needed. Christian moral bases and rules of values are not merely the ideology of a specific group of people; they are the basis of interpersonal relationships and of human society itself. And we, as a church, have also matured and learned and, I dare say, been cleansed.

We can now offer a Christian life-style to society and to the free individual. And it is up to the Christians as to how intensely and strongly they will be able to live by it. During the past 40 years, the church has realized that its role is to serve. Therefore, we want to serve society. Our basic guidelines are the guidelines of the Second Vatican Council. It seems to us that what the council proposed corresponds to the experiences we ourselves had. After the fall of communism, a new sphere opened up to us, leading to happiness and personal well-being. In Western Europe, we can now see that the people did not find the complete happiness and well-being they sought. I think the reaction to this realization will also set a new orientation in seeking spiritual values in our country and in Europe.

*** Examination of Sudeten German Issue**
93CH0251A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech
22 Dec 92 p 6

[Article by Andrea Barsova, legal historian: "A Burning Settlement—Indemnification for Sudeten Germans; The Sudeten German Question Is a Question of a Right to a Homeland and Ownership"]

[Text] *"It would be well to stamp every application for indemnification with a stamp that reads 'undesirable person,' in the event such an applicant were to attempt to visit us."* According to Jiri Hanak, a Czech intellectual with a reputation for being an unthreatened democrat, this is an appropriate response to the demands by the Sudeten German

Compatriot Association that a dialogue be initiated regarding disputed questions. His "debt" (LIDOVE NOVINY, 4 December 1992) was like a slap across the face of the Czech silence. His masterful pen sparkles with hatred, and the manipulation of facts comes close to being a lie. Therefore, it is not possible to let it pass unnoticed.

For purposes of a sensible discussion of the Sudeten German question, it is necessary to define two concepts: Who are the Sudeten Germans, and what constitutes that disputed debt to which they are laying claim? There is no room here for excursions into events of long ago. There is no choice but to make use of abbreviated history. The Sudeten Germans are children of this country, of the Czech land, which, at one time, was home not only for us. The Benes Decrees are decisive for purposes of judging their applications. Sudeten Germans are those people who had their Czechoslovak citizenship "modified." They are people who had their property confiscated. They are the ones who were forced to involuntarily leave the land of their fathers. I do not know what J. Hanak meant by his words about an "accidental group of German citizens." The Sudeten Germans could justifiably perceive those words to be an unfounded insult.

And what is it that those people want? Nothing less than that the Czech Republic recognize the validity of the Munich Accords. That is how J. Hanak translated their applications for indemnification—with the sleight of hand of a magician who places a ball into a hat only to withdraw a rabbit from it. A journalist should know, however, that the Sudeten German question is not a territorial question. It is not possible to derive a territorial claim from the demands for indemnification. To the extent to which the Sudeten German Compatriot Association were to raise such a demand, it would be acting in conflict with the laws of its country. The question of the borders of Germany was resolved by both international accords and, indirectly, by expunging the "unification" Article 23 from the German Constitution. If J. Hanak has any kind of proof for his contention, he should present it.

The Sudeten German question is a question of a right to a homeland and to ownership. The right to a homeland means the right to return. It has to do with the possible granting of Czech citizenship to those who evince an interest in it. The right to ownership is that which it is: the right to have confiscated property returned or to be compensated for it.

There is no argument about the fact that, if Czechoslovakia were to proceed today against any kind of group of citizens in the way it at one time acted against the Sudeten Germans, it would be a gross violation of human rights from the standpoint of international law. The work of German historians and lawyers who deal with the "expatriation" contains a detailed listing of articles of all appropriate international accords. The majority of those documents, however, came into being after 1947. Were not the Benes Decrees a violation of domestic law? Were they not in conflict with the then valid Constitution? Contemporary legal doctrine considers that everything that occurred "on the basis of the will of the people" until 1948 is legitimate. To solve those

difficult legal problems, a corps of learned heads should be convened. But the legislators have already once crossed the magical border of February 1948. And that occurred precisely during the restitution of agricultural property confiscated from Germans and Hungarians to whom Czechoslovak citizenship was subsequently regranted.

For the time being, from the standpoint of positive rights, it is at least theoretically possible to arrive at a correct solution; moral judgments regarding guilt and punishment can and will be at variance. Even the ethics of historical reprisal and collective punishment inserted in the background of the Palacky concept of Czech history represents a certain moral position. J. Hanak shares it with a considerable portion of the population of the Czech Republic. It is not possible to be overly surprised at that majority of normal people: They were raised this way. From Benes, through the communists, up to the present government (with the exception of President Havel), those in power always told them that the "expatriation" was fair.

Most of the current considerations regarding the Sudeten German question are not concerned with good and evil. Whether the demand by the Sudeten Germans is justified, we simply cannot afford it. We are far too poor, and people cannot be deprived of roofs over their heads. That is also the character of Hanak's concluding argument—namely, that "no government in Prague that would seriously be considering the annulment of the Benes Decrees could survive. And, after that, there would already be the threatening contours of leftist nationalist power." It is true that even an enlightened sovereign finds it hard to have things his way if the opinion of the people is running against him. However, J. Hanak as a representative of the fourth estate bears his share of responsibility for this opinion.

* **Privatized Press Distribution Seen as Monopoly**
93CH0250C Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech
24 Dec 92 p 1

[Interview with Czech National Council Deputies Petr Kohacek and Milena Kolarova by Jana Navratilova; place and date not given: "The Media's Independence, Conflict of Interest in the Distribution of the Press?"]

[Text] [Navratilova] In connection with the privatization of the PNS [Postal Newspaper Service], one question keeps surfacing: How long will independent newspapers continue to be published in our country? A significant number of this monopoly distribution company's shares is owned by the publishers of a few periodicals. We posed this question to

members of the CNR [Czech National Council] Petr Kohacek and Milena Kolarova (both ODS [Civic Democratic Party]).

[Kohacek] I believe that the basic principle of a democratic state is the number and independence of the media. It seems that, as far as the press is concerned, we are in a situation where a monopoly distributor is obviously promoting certain papers that are of particular interest to it, and other papers have distinct disadvantages. In my opinion, the present situation, which is the result of a monopoly and the strange ownership of the distribution organization PNS's shares, is no guarantee that this crucial point will not threaten democracy. As a member of the CNR, I want to participate in changing this situation. A press distributor must have a definite obligation—to distribute all dailies, without exception, equally throughout the territory of the CR [Czech Republic]. It will also be important to impose this obligation when granting licenses to all daily newspaper salesmen. It will be necessary to set a period during which a newspaper salesman will have the obligation to sell a complete range of all dailies published in the CR. The problem is that, to some extent, this impinges on human rights, and, thus, the regulation can only be done through law. However, I am convinced that the imposition of this obligation will be in the interests of all citizens in this Republic. I would also like to emphasize that it will be necessary to work together with the Government of the CR on this new idea of the law.

[Navratilova] RUDE PRAVO, MLADA FRONTA DNES, BLESK, and LIDOVE NOVINY own shares in the PNS. Is it not a conflict of interest if the publishers of newspapers simultaneously distribute them?

[Kohacek] Basically, I do not believe it is good if any owner of a daily has a financial interest in the distribution of a competitor's paper. Nevertheless, if the obligations I mentioned are imposed on the newspaper salesmen by law, this need not be a major problem. Ideally, it would be best if no daily owned even half a share in the distribution network.

[Kolarova] The situation in our country still differs from that in neighboring democratic countries. Here, the newspapers are still changing their nature and format, new ones are coming into being, and, in time, they could become better than what we have now. Therefore, at this time, I think it would be better if publishers did not have any share in the distribution. A few days ago, the daily PROSTOR was discontinued. TELEGRAF still exists for the time being. In addition, according to my information, the editors of the daily PROSTOR are transferring to LIDOVÁ DEMOKRACIE, which is changing its nature as a result. Therefore, if we wish to intervene in the rights of the salesmen, the only possible way to do so is through a law.

*** European Unity, Integration, EC Discussed**

93CH0309B Budapest TOZSDE KURIR in Hungarian
17 Dec 92 p 3

[Interview with Hungarian Academy of Science Chairman Domokos Kosary by Andras Toro; place and date not given: "The Path"]

[Text] *The establishment of European unity is one of the most important global issues. In the present phase of the unification process, both political and economic issue arise in an equally marked fashion. Prof. Domokos Kosary, the chairman of the Hungarian Academy of Science [MTA], is also the chairman of the Hungarian Council of the Movement for Europe. We conversed with him about Hungary's new opportunities on the international scene.*

[Kosary] The framework and the substantive details of integration are viewed in several different ways in the western part of Europe, and again differently by us. It is difficult on both sides to choose between the available alternatives. Westerners are faced with the dilemma of whether they should retain their narrow scope that functions well, but the question is for how long they can do so before integrating the eastern areas? But that region harbors threats, it is unpredictable, unstable, and suspect, and additionally, its economies, and thus also its societies, are lagging behind. Some unexpected threats could arise if the West chose the easier solution of isolation. At the same time, however, this half of the continent represents a huge market from their standpoint. It also presents dangers, of course, particularly if they close their doors to easterners. Misery and instability could lead to social and national conflicts. There already exist unfortunate examples for this today. The EC was simply unable to handle the Yugoslav issue. Ongoing processes could become unpredictable if some groups drew erroneous conclusions based on the events, i.e., if various obscure forces became bold.

The eastern side also faces a choice. For certain countries it may appear easier to return to the 19th century, to the age of early capitalism, rather than trying to catch up with more regulated, modern market economies of our day. As a result of doing so, however, we could also witness a recurrence of the 19th-century solution of social and national conflicts, and this would be far more dangerous today than in the 19th century. To avoid this situation the states involved must surrender their exclusive nation-state concepts. They must give up the idea of having a single nation reign within given political borders, and of having a single person, the leader of a country, decide what to do. Simply put: The east must also make a difficult decision.

When mentioning difficulties, we do not mean to refer merely to ways in which economic approaches can be made. Portugal, after all, was not too close to France when it was admitted to the EC. This was based on a political decision. Shall I mention Turkey? In other words, the question we raised involves not only economic, technical, and infrastructural levels—these, too, are involved, of course—but also other matters. And this is what we, the committed supporters of the Movement for Europe must endeavor to

have recognized by the broadest possible public here in Hungary, as well as in other countries. So that the easier solution is not chosen either by the West or the East.

[Toro] Mr. Chairman, to what extent could economic cooperation, the strengthening of relations encourage integration? Or, would you say that the interests of Western economies are enforced exclusively through political avenues?

[Kosary] Let us consider the French conduct in regard to agricultural produce and related state subsidies. These issues impact Hungary rather closely. Nevertheless, I hope, that the political decisions made will be of a kind based on the best choice of a variety of economic solutions, which are most appropriate from the standpoint of all interested parties and which do not conflict with political principles.

[Toro] The Movement for Europe has been established and is functioning in most European countries. Are its organizations capable of assessing the magnitude of the obstacles and of presenting the available choices?

[Kosary] The organization is still in its infancy; moreover, its level of development varies from country to country. The Hungarian organization is the most highly developed in this region of Europe. Thus, by no coincidence, last year's general meeting of the Movement for Europe was held in Budapest. The Croats asked us the other day to support their admission to the Brussels headquarters. We will, of course, support their request. I met the Romanians not too long ago; their situation is by far more difficult than ours due to their extreme nationalistic political tendencies.

[Toro] Does the Europe concept enjoy mass support? Have people realized what awaits them, or what they must do in order to establish unity?

[Kosary] Conditions are not bad in Hungary, we do have a mass base of support. Moreover, many people expect to see a miracle. At the same time, however, some opposite forces can also be seen; these would be inclined to turn away from the Europe concept. But there is no alternative progressive trend. Looking back, what seems to be the finding of, an apology for the past is a false path, and also a very dangerous path to follow.

[Toro] Once Europe becomes a tangible reality, it must also have an impact on scientific work and research. It was obviously no coincidence that you, the chairman of the MTA, became the chairman of the Hungarian Council of the Movement for Europe.

[Kosary] In a personal sense one should not necessarily seek to find a direct link between the two, but insofar as the future of science and Europe is concerned, the linkage is clear-cut. Hungarian scientific development and an economic uplift can be perceived solely and exclusively under the European horizon. All other paths lead us to a point where we become marginal; moreover, the other paths also exert a discrediting effect. Our good international image of today would be reversed.

[Box, p 3]

Who Wins—Who Loses?

Scientific progress can only be perceived within the European framework; at the same time, however, the events of recent weeks and months serve as a warning: We cannot be certain about the survival of the MTA research places until integration takes place. The mostly continuous budget rescissions threaten work at the 39 research institutes of the Academy, according to several statements made at the Academy. These institutions conduct basic research which "does not pay for itself," i.e., it must be financed. A long time ago the MTA had its own assets, but these assets no longer exist. In olden days one could find money in the form of returns on these assets. Today, however, it would be too early to dream about enterprise or foundation sponsors. Accordingly, the only remaining source is the state, the state budget.

But by rendering basic research impossible—and this is an important argument—the budget could gain between 4 and 5 billion forints at most, and the Ministry of Finance should consider the fact that by gaining this amount it could also cause irreparable damage. They would exclude Hungarian science from international competition, would hinder integration and our joining of Europe. This is the firmly held view of MTA Chairman Domokos Kosary.

The funny thing is that despite earlier rescissions, the research network of the Academy continues to function; moreover, it does so quite well, as compared to various specialized fields of research, many of which have already experienced financial collapse. Next year's plan also calls for survival only; this can be accomplished by reallocating resources and by organizing work of no small proportion, according to the chairman of the Academy.

Researchers develop certain research topics in the framework of international cooperation, while other topics are entered in response to competitive announcements issued by international organizations. The MTA scored one of its recent successes at the Strasbourg general meeting of the European Sciences Foundation, where an announcement was made that the MTA received financing for research regarding the situation and collective rights of national minorities. Chairman Kosary regards this as important particularly in light of the fact that thus far talk in Europe pertained to securing individual human rights only. At this point, however, it appears that the Hungarian position has prevailed: Collective rights can be demanded from every state that seriously wants to join Europe, and not only on a pro forma basis.

*** Opposition Leaders View Closer Cooperation**
93CH0274B Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian
22 Dec 92 pp 4-5

[Interview with Ivan Peto, Gyula Horn, and Viktor Orban, leaders of the Alliance of Free Democrats, the Hungarian Socialist Party, and the Alliance of Young Democrats, respectively, by Eszter Radai; place and date

not given: "The First Slap in the Face Is the Biggest One; Opposition Alternative? Offenses Belong to Memoirs"]

[Text] *Leading politicians of the three opposition parties met at a presentation last week to discuss whether closer cooperation in parliament is possible. Eszter Radai interviewed the three politicians: Ivan Peto (SZDSZ) [Alliance of Free Democrats], Gyula Horn (MSZP) [Hungarian Socialist Party], and Viktor Orban (FIDESZ) [Alliance of Young Democrats].*

[Radai] "Opposition alternative?" Do you agree with, or did you agree to, this title, or could it be that you yourselves recommended or chose this title? In any event, it was attractive to the audience; there were so many people that some had to hang on to the chandeliers. Elderly ladies and gentlemen were sitting on the floor; they put up with this much hardship because they were curious what you would say about the opposition alternative.

[Orban] I knew of the title; all I asked for was that the organizers put a question mark at the end of the title.

[Radai] Did Ivan Peto, too, insist on the question mark?

[Peto] I was not even asked, I was only informed. I heard the word "alternative" from the title, and I believe that the audience heard the same. Some kind of an alternative to the present ruling coalition is needed. The word in front of this term, whether it is an "opposition" alternative, a "liberal" alternative, or, perhaps, some other alternative, was chosen based on the hopes of each individual according to his own personality and taste, and the response came accordingly.

The Dangers of Becoming a Bloc

[Radai] How do people feel who would not vote for today's ruling parties? Would they like to see closer cooperation among the opposition parties—an opposition alternative?

[Horn] Based on the public mood I sense that people want to see a change in politics, style, and practice. People feel that they would vote for anyone in 1994, except for those presently in power. From a practical standpoint, there exists an opposition alternative in parliament today, and by this I mean that virtually no legislative proposal or serious issue is presented to parliament to which some kind of opposition alternative does not evolve—if not in every case, but in a majority of the cases. I am convinced that if things progress the way they did so far, there could be closer cooperation between the three opposition parties, whether we want this to happen or not. There should be no misunderstanding: We are not offering ourselves to the liberal parties. We have our own party line and perceptions, we represent those, but in most instances these are the same as theirs.

[Orban] I don't know how many times I must say this, but a united opposition, as such, does not exist. Cooperation among the opposition parties is possible regarding the choice and resolution of individual issues until 1994 and subject to what happens in 1994, but we do not find it necessary to have comprehensive, strategic cooperation, the development of a united opposition alternative, if you will. To the contrary: we would regard this as rather harmful. Comprehensive, strategic cooperation would diminish

opportunities for communications between today's opposition parties and today's ruling parties. I would not like to see a party bloc system evolve in Hungary by having an antifascist bloc on one side and an anticommunist bloc on the other. I would like to see a situation—and this is also in the country's interest—in which the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] organizes its ranks and becomes acceptable not only to FIDESZ, but to all opposition parties, just as the opposition parties could become mutually acceptable partners under certain circumstances. Accordingly, I would be highly opposed to a situation in which today's ruling coalition as a whole, including its supporters, is excluded from the organizations with which we could conceivable cooperate in 1994, after the elections. This is important not only because such exclusion would not benefit relations between the parties and legislative work in parliament after the next elections, but also because the political parties should not feel that the 1994 elections represent a life or death struggle. The evolution of such blocs could develop a reflex on both sides to the effect that the one who wins the elections liquidates the other. For this reason, declarations like this, voicing and establishing some symbolic opposition unity that has no practical significance whatsoever today, are not desirable in my view.

[Radai] On the other hand, quite a few statements were made by the SZDSZ, and by FIDESZ, too, if I recall correctly, according to which chances of cooperating with the MDF are continuously diminishing.

[Peto] Before saying anything else, I would like to state that I do not recognize as real the threat of evolving antifascist and anticommunist blocs. In this sense, insofar as communications between the parties are concerned, an infinite number of variations exist for coalitions. The basic standard in this regard is that the parties accept democracy as the framework. In that framework an infinite number of possible variations exists indeed. Today's MDF is not suited to, let's say, form a coalition with today's opposition parties. But endeavors within the MDF exist which could easily, according to accepted customs, lead to the formation of a coalition with, let's say, the SZDSZ, or, supposedly, with FIDESZ. In other words, today's party structures are probably stable; these are the parties that are going to be seated in the next parliament. But I am not at all certain that these parties—let's say, today's ruling parties—are going to mean the same as they do today. This situation cannot remain the same after the elections.

[Horn] Should the MDF evolve into a right-wing party in the European sense, because Hungary, too, needs a classic Right, in the European sense of that term, the Socialist Party would not rule out the possibility of close cooperation, or, perhaps, cooperation in the framework of a coalition.

[Radai] While opposition party leaders are not and never were averse to such things, and always talked about their openness, I have not heard a single statement from the leaders of the ruling parties, from anyone whose word amounts to something, about a conceivable coalition some time in the future with any of today's coalition parties.

Hints of this nature were made regarding FIDESZ, but I never heard anything like this regarding the SZDSZ.

[Orban] They might be serious about this. During the past year a certain self-hypnosis has become characteristic of the ruling coalition parties. They truly interpret the country's public mood as one that enables the three of them, the way they are, to win the next elections without having to worry about anything. And they are not joking when they say such things. I could, of course, respond with a cheap joke and say that as long as they do not have enough sense to recognize the importance of enabling democratic-minded political parties in Hungary to form coalitions at any time, we should at least have enough sense to recognize the significance of this. We should remain open for the sake of the country, and should remain unaffected by their exclusionary outlook, and by their periodic gestures which hurt our feelings very much. A new situation will present itself after the 1994 elections; the time will come when they manifest more modesty.

Twists and Thrusts, and Promises

[Radai] Returning to the subject of cooperation among the three opposition parties, a question was asked here to which Gyula Horn did not respond: With which liberal party does the MSZP have better relations?

[Horn] I answered that question. I said that the relationship is good with both parties.

[Orban] Compared to that, MSZP Representative Gyuri Keleti struck us in the side in today's newspapers.

[Horn] Excuse me, but we should not be sitting at the same table if I were to recite all that Viktor Orban says to various audiences, as reported by the press.... Excuse me, but Viktor Orban periodically states that we are demagogues, that we make promises, and similar things....

[Orban] Criticizing someone in a way that critique also means a certain distancing represents dumb politics in Hungary. There you have the MSZP's example, for instance. This evening I made myself quite clear when saying that we have serious differences with the MSZP, but if I pretended that these did not exist, if I transcended the abyss and the differences that strongly separated us before, there would be no way whatsoever for cooperation in the future. We must discuss these things on quiet evenings like this one, in a calm atmosphere, and only after that should we discuss the causes and the roots of our conflicts, after discussing these things, if we did not hide these things from our constituents, if we did not want to form a coalition under the table and akin to a coup d'état with anyone, be that the MSZP or the MDF.

[Radai] Many feel that FIDESZ's critique of the MSZP is on the increase whenever...

[Horn] ...whenever the MSZP is gaining strength...

[Radai] ...whenever the MSZP is gaining strength. When FIDESZ feels that the SZDSZ may clean up its affairs after electing a chairman, FIDESZ's critique of the SZDSZ also increases.

[Orban] One could find many reasons for this kind of thing, but it is most simple to try to find the obvious answer. I regard the conditions of the SZDSZ as suitable for cooperation, much more suitable than before. There are no partisan political considerations behind this; it's just that I see the situation that way, and you know, I might even be candid. As I said at today's meeting, I do not see the Socialist Party as gaining strength. The MSZP is gaining strength in a different way, but not from the standpoint of support. An increasing number of people feel that they can openly state their liking of the MSZP. The MSZP's voice became louder because it hears its voice echoed by the intelligentsia, by its old base, the one that molds public opinion. This represents no increase in mass support, but my diagnosis may be based only on what I see through FIDESZ's spectacles, and may have little to do with reality.

[Horn] I fully agree with what Viktor Orban had to say at the end of his statement. I agree with the distorted eyeglasses, with the FIDESZ spectacles. I believe this not because we are conceited, but because we are looking at the most recent interim parliamentary election results. I do not even mention Kisber and Oroszlany anymore, and the seats in local government. I do not know what these election victories represent, if not...

[Orban] ...and in Zalaegerszeg and Keszthely, too?

[Horn] Well, there are a few, rare examples. Even a blind hen finds a kernel, but I would like to underscore that during the past two and a half years we did not make a single adverse statement about FIDESZ. We also tried to reconcile things with the SZDSZ.

[Rada] Why is it that FIDESZ is the definitive factor, so to speak, in the relationship between the three parties?

[Orban] Our view differs most from the other two; this, however, does not mean that we are by all means correct.

[Rada] And yet, I recall that the MSZP has been seeking closer cooperation with the other two opposition parties since the elections, and this kind of approach usually ends with the MSZP being tapped on the nose. The SZDSZ has also received a few cold showers from FIDESZ, and it was FIDESZ that administered slaps in the face so far. In other words, it seems that this situation, this sober declaration, is the result of this brief history from the standpoint of every party.

[Orban] I recall this differently. I do not recall slapping others in the face. Instead, I recall that we were the ones who had to step ahead and that we received the initial slaps in the face regarding certain issues. And as we all know, the first slaps are always the strongest.

[Peto] I think we could compete with each other in this regard, but I do not believe that it would make sense to draw up a list of offenses showing who conducted himself more heroically at given points in time. The consequences of the ruling coalition's conduct vis-a-vis the opposition are visible. This conduct had an adverse effect on all three opposition parties: In different ways and for different reasons, and deliberately or by accident, the ruling coalition created

a stronger opposition than the kind it would have had to face had it conducted normal, balanced political discourse. Today's opposition, i.e., the three opposition parties, takes a united stand in very many respects, not on the basis of a plan, nor based on previous discussions of issues, but because of the manner in which the ruling coalition operates. From this standpoint the offenses we all suffered are a secondary issue, or amount to a nice history only, to be written up in memoirs.

* Candidates for Prime Minister in 1994
Discussed

93CH0274C Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian
22 Dec 92 pp 6-7

[Interview with Zoltan Gal, Gabor Fodor, and Laszlo Medgyassay, leading politicians of the Hungarian Socialist Party, the Alliance of Young Democrats, and the Hungarian Democratic Forum, respectively, by Katalin Rangos; place and date not given: "Kupa, Nemeth, Suranyi...Who Is Going To Be the Next Prime Minister? Political Rumors and Flirtations"]

[Text] Political gossip, rumors, and leaks are well known to be organic parts of partisan tactics. This is one reason why we should not simply dismiss rumors about whom the various parties would like to see as their head of government, should they win the elections in 1994. It is too early to guess of course, but opinions formed on the basis of talk around town is by far not uninteresting. Particularly when prominent personalities of the parties state their views of the supposed candidates of other parties, and if they also comment on guesses concerning their own parties. Zoltan Gal, Gabor Fodor, and Laszlo Medgyassay agreed to join the guessing game on behalf of the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party], FIDESZ [Alliance of Young Democrats], and the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], respectively. Katalin Rangos conversed with them.

[Rangos] What do you have to say if I tell you that supposedly, Gyorgy Suranyi, the former president of the Hungarian National Bank [MNB], is FIDESZ's candidate for prime minister?

[Gal] What ministry is Viktor Orban going to head in that government? I have not heard of this, but it is by all means an interesting combination. It contains a certain critique in part of the present government, and in part of the present FIDESZ leadership.

[Rangos] And have you heard that Mihaly Kupa is the MDF's candidate for prime minister?

[Gal] I have heard that already. And how about Csurka?

[Rangos] Do you regard Mihaly Kupa as a more likely candidate than Istvan Csurka?

[Gal] Considering the present developments, I am afraid that Mihaly Kupa is not overly popular outside of the MDF base. In a somewhat more serious vein I would immediately add that of course the government needs some competent politicians, but if they lack the supporting base, if they lack an organization that links the government with society, a

cabinet becomes nonfunctional, irrespective of how smart the people in government are, although we are not threatened by this scenario at present. Incidentally, I know this from my own experience.

[Rangos] Insofar as the MSZP is concerned, what relationship would you develop with the supposed candidate, regardless of whether he represents the MDF or FIDESZ?

[Gal] I am not certain that these gentlemen are going to become members of the cabinet. Not Mihaly Kupa, in particular, because if he ran under the MDF colors in the next elections, the present situation does not promise much good for him. In any event, the MSZP will be able to oppose them in the elections with a politician competent in the field of economics.

A Sterile Candidate

[Rangos] Do you already know whom you would run against him? Recent rumors have it that Miklos Nemeth is going to be the MSZP's candidate for prime minister.

[Gal] At this moment I cannot tell you who our candidate for prime minister will be, if we become the ruling power. I repeat: The only certainty is that the person we nominate is going to be highly competent in the field of economics.

[Rangos] Have you heard the gossip according to which Miklos Nemeth would be the MSZP's candidate for prime minister?

[Fodor] Of course I have, that gossip is rather widespread. What I see in this candidacy is what I believe most people are reminded of, namely, that this could produce larger percentages for the MSZP, and that this is why they are experimenting with this idea. If we take this seriously, I regard the entire situation as somewhat unreal, because Miklos Nemeth has been working in London and has not been in Hungary for years....

[Rangos] But the elections are not being held today....

[Fodor] Indeed, but one should be in Hungary if he wants to run in the elections. So that I regard Miklos Nemeth as a somewhat sterile candidate....

[Rangos] Don't you think that in a certain political situation being sterile, and not being in Hungary, could be viewed as an advantage?

[Fodor] This is conceivable, but I believe that viewed from another standpoint it could be rather unpleasant if one is not in Hungary and is simply unable to pay attention to certain things. In other words, he could be asked questions that he could not answer, he could be driven into a dead-end street from where he could not go on. And these kinds of things are significant before elections. Therefore, if I were Miklos Nemeth, I would under no circumstance accept a nomination to become prime minister. He undoubtedly has acquired some clout in this country. To use a big word: He has written his name into Hungarian history. At this point, however, he has a decent job, through which he can do something for Hungary. Accordingly, if I were in his shoes, I would not risk this entire thing.

[Rangos] Should he accept nevertheless, could he destroy his clout?

[Fodor] One way or another, he himself could be consumed by this. And it is not certain that he could really do something. Because in the election struggle, especially those having good chances of winning would certainly receive huge slaps in the face. One could certainly pull out some anterior means regarding Miklos Nemeth, because his opponents are not going to be choosy.

Names Floating Around

[Rangos] Are you aware of allegations that Mihaly Kupa is going to be the MDF's candidate?

[Fodor] Of course I am, although there are some other candidates too. For example, I have seen Peter Boross' name floating around. I like Mihaly Kupa, and quite obviously the MDF is desperately seeking a candidate who could try to resolve the increasingly catastrophic situation. With his interesting character and good sense of humor, Mihaly Kupa could temporarily pull out the MDF from this critical situation. The MDF could benefit if Kupa stressed his personal characteristics. But I am not certain that he would win if he relied on the kind of finance minister he was.

[Rangos] Despite semiofficial reports according to which Viktor Orban is FIDESZ's candidate for party chairman as well as for prime minister, rumors have it that your candidate for prime minister is Gyorgy Suranyi....

[Fodor] If I were the Russian foreign minister I would surely say: of course, naturally, this is the case. Thereafter I would retract all this, claiming that this was only a good joke. I like Gyorgy Suranyi, of course. And he is an excellent man. But he is not FIDESZ's candidate.

[Rangos] Political analysts and lay politician claim to know that you are looking for faces that could lend credibility to your politics and could also obtain votes. But what kind of prestigious, staid people could represent the kind of politics which you consistently try to enforce in parliament?

[Fodor] Indeed, we are trying to present elderly people around FIDESZ, who possess these virtues. But I do not believe FIDESZ should think in terms of a candidate for prime minister who has not been a member of FIDESZ so far. In other words, your suggestion could be a good joke to be used on the first of April....

[Rangos] Is it an April joke that you are willing to cooperate with the MDF liberals, at a time when I have not even heard jokes about your party talking to anyone from among the prominent people of the Smallholders Party? In other words: Whom else are you flirting with?

[Fodor] Well yes, one can have flirtations, because in the end we would like to cooperate with every sober force. We could do this with the greatest of ease with the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], but we must also be open to MSZP and MDF thinkers acceptable to us. Accordingly, it is not at all an April joke that we are open in every direction.

[Rangos] We also heard that you made contact with Imre Pozsgay....

[Fodor] This would really be a rather big joke....

[Rangos] In other words, we should take seriously only those political flirtations which you conduct with the MDF liberals....

[Fodor] This should be regarded more like befriending each other; there is no flirtation, in my view. And this process of becoming friendly should be taken seriously, of course. But we could also become friendly with the Christian Democrats if they had a trend like this—for which there is no chance, however.

Mysterious Hearsay

[Rangos] What do you have to say to the hearsay—if you heard it at all—according to which Miklos Nemeth is the MSZP's candidate for prime minister?

[Medgyasszay] Several people have raised this possibility jokingly, mysteriously. I would be very pleased to personally meet with Miklos Nemeth some day, because I value highly his work during the transition period.

[Rangos] And do you see a realistic basis for this kind of guessing?

[Medgyasszay] Miklos Nemeth is certainly going to think very hard about when he should reappear in the Hungarian political arena. And he probably will also consider in what colors to run.

[Rangos] Would it be conceivable for Miklos Nemeth not to run in the MSZP colors, but, let's say, as the candidate of another party? Public opinion researchers claim that he could contribute 4, 5, or 6 percent more votes to any party.

[Medgyasszay] I do not believe that the chance of winning would determine his party standing. I know him to be far more above board than that. But I could imagine a situation in which he would not side with the MSZP.

[Rangos] Which party would he join, in your view?

[Medgyasszay] Guessing is always risky in politics, because one is held to account for such guesses later. Permit me not to make guesses. In any event, I believe that the person of Miklos Nemeth could become significant from the standpoint of the country some day. But perhaps not in 1994.

[Rangos] Could his person be significant from the standpoint of the MDF, in your view?

[Medgyasszay] In certain relationships, the person of every serious Hungarian politician could be important to the MDF....

[Rangos] Aside from that, would you be able to pursue joint politics with the MSZP in 1994?

[Medgyasszay] Many things are possible in the realm of politics, but this one is not a likely possibility.

[Rangos] Other hearsay information claims that FIDESZ might nominate Gyorgy Suranyi for prime minister.

[Medgyasszay] Could this be the reason for FIDESZ wanting to extend the age limit? I don't know. FIDESZ is capable of doing many things. All I know—and this, too, is hearsay information—is that Suranyi has very good relations with certain FIDESZ leaders.

[Rangos] Could FIDESZ be acceptable to the MDF if it adopted a new political setup?

[Medgyasszay] I would like to stress that this is my personal opinion. Accordingly, from my standpoint, FIDESZ could have been a partner in 1990. But by now these boys have removed themselves farther from me. Accordingly, it would be hard to imagine a structure in which I could work with them.

[Rangos] And have you heard of Mihaly Kupa becoming the MDF's nominee for prime minister?

[Medgyasszay] The MDF has a prime minister who is going to continue to be our nominee, and on whom we can also count in the future.

* Former State Secretary Views Economic Laws

93CH0282B Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
23 Dec 92 p 10

[Article by Tamas Sarkozy, former state secretary under the Nemeth administration: "On Economic Legislation: A Step Forward, Slow Progress; The Author Thinks Hungary Can Claim That the Conditions for Market Economy Have Been Basically Set"]

[Text] The year 1992 was an important one in Hungarian economic legislation. The creation of laws to regulate the basic institutions of market economy slowed down in the spring of 1990 and then, in the wake of the Kupa program, it gained momentum again. The boom in economic legislation, which was already apparent in the second half of 1991, continued in 1992 until the fall of this year. However, while in 1991 the new laws involved mainly finances (accounting law, bankruptcy law, central bank law, financial institution law, etc.), 1992 saw the legislation of basic laws on business status (the rights of the state sector, privatization, labor conditions, legal regulation of cooperatives). After the year 1992, we can say that the economic laws that constitute the indispensable preconditions for creating a private market economy were in essence legislated in Hungary between 1988 and 1992. In 1993-94, the new economic laws are expected to concentrate on these two areas:

- a) The legislation of economic branch laws (e.g., railway, water management, energy, etc.);
- b) The legislation of laws that complement the economy from "humane" aspects (social, environmental protection, etc.).

The rights of individual and joint ventures (Statutes 1990.V and 1988.VI) continued secure in 1992. Statute 1992.LV

brought two significant changes, namely, that private persons and foreigners may also establish a single-person stock company, and that the vague possibilities for business partnerships to separate were extensively regulated legally in 1989.

In the cooperative sector, activity was connected primarily with the so-called transition law (Statute 1992.II), and the changing of old-type cooperatives into new-type cooperatives, the allocation of property, and the breakup of companies elicited great political struggle. While many wanted to modify the transition law even before it was published in the MAGYAR KOZLONY (and modification proposals are still pouring in), the real cooperative law (Statute 1991.I) was received with unjustified (but perhaps beneficial) silence, even though this law, structured similarly to the partnership law, made significant connections between cooperatives and business partnerships, and made the form of cooperative suitable for investments. Unfortunately, only cooperatives can change into stock companies or limited companies for the time being, the option of change not being unequivocally reciprocal (just as a state enterprise cannot be changed, for the time being, into a cooperative, even though numerous state enterprises were operated before 1945 as cooperatives). Hopefully, the new process of forming modern cooperatives will start in 1993.

In commercial legal terminology, the traditional state enterprises of socialism were essentially institutions of public law (the so-called enterprise under state supervision). In my opinion, the form of the so-called autonomous state enterprise (enterprise council, general assembly, delegates' assembly), introduced in Hungary in 1984, were progressive in the mid 1980's from the aspect of socialist traditions, but obviously became obsolete under the conditions of private market economy and cannot be conformed to the European Community's corporate structures. For this reason, it is definitely laudable that Statutes 1992.LIII and 1992.LIV will essentially transform state enterprises into commercial partnerships in two years. Also, one can only approve the elimination of all obsolete "institutional" corporate structures (e.g., the so-called subsidiary enterprise or society enterprise) during this extended period. This is, then, a significant step forward.

It is another matter that the two statutes mentioned try to carry out this transformation in an overcentralized and uniform way and essentially without any normative conditions. The statutes start with the unlimited power of state ownership, terminating the guarantees for company autonomy that were developed after 1968 and handling the legal entity of state enterprises as a purely technical category (they have provisions for state enterprise assets and not for state enterprises). It is also controversial that the list of assets determined to remain under permanent state ownership is too extensive (about 30 percent) and that the state enterprise-turned stock companies have been indiscriminately put under the supervision of the State Property

Management Company, a state-owned super holding company (in my opinion, a decentralized and independent holding company structure would have been a more expedient solution).

In essence, in view of the different points of view of the earlier three partial privatization statutes (transformation law, state property protection law, and the law regulating the State Property Agency's legal status) with regard to legal and economic policies as well as the confusion created by their frequent modifications, Statute 1992.LIV is a uniform privatization law and can be considered significant in terms of legal uniformity. Of course, the statute still regulates privatization as carried out by the centralized state, but with refinements in certain questions (e.g., the conversion of enterprise asset vouchers to workers' stocks, or the participation of local governments in privatization); it also provides a legal basis for the so-called enterprise self-privatization (a simplified privatization process) and introduces new and more flexible mechanisms for privatization (e.g., privatization leasing).

Statute 1992.XXII finally said good-bye to the Labor Code, perhaps our most obsolete "socialist" code. In my opinion, the new statute laudably puts individual employment relations on a purely contractual basis, providing modern regulations for work contracts. Putting collective employment relations in order is the Achilles heel of the new LC. But legal regulations of collective labor rights cannot be adequate until a system of employers' and employees' unions that is normal in a private market economy is developed, until union elections take place, and until an institutional process of business interest reconciliation is created.

The last financial law worth mentioning is the public finance law (Statute 1992.XXXVIII). Of course, this law cannot solve the problems of reform of public finances or the problems of the so-called large allocation systems and unrealistically high expenditures but, by laying a legal foundation, it at least embarks on the road of modernizing funds and restoring order in the management of the treasury. This statute offers more-modern regulations regarding the legal status of budget offices and the streamlining of treasury management.

All this is no small achievement. Of course, numerous problems and flaws remain. The legal quality of the statutes is often rather low (a consequence of inadequate preparation and the ensuing confused parliamentary debate), and there are constant contradictions and a lack of coordination between the statutes. The preparation of the bills was connected neither with institutional surveys on their effects nor with surveys on costs and ripple effects. There is no institutional economic deregulation, and concrete coordination with European Community laws has barely begun. Nonetheless, the automatic mechanisms of market economy are beginning to work, the caravan is moving. And we have a realistic chance to develop a higher quality, coordinated, and financial legal system of European caliber by 1995-96.

* **Suchocka Opines on Coalition, Abortion, Economy**
93EP0151C Warsaw WPROST in Polish No 51/52,
20-27 Dec 92 p 53

[Unattributed interview with Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka; place and date not given; questions and answers were submitted on paper in early December 1992: "Fire and Water"]

[Text] [WPROST] What did you talk about with Deputy Prime Minister Goryszewski, who declared, while you were in Denmark, that the government could survive without the Democratic Union?

[Suchocka] That "conversation" is familiar to all those who are interested in politics in Poland because it was held through the media of the press and television. It was from the press that I learned about the deputy prime minister's comments. On television, when a reporter asked me for a comment while I still was in Copenhagen, I answered that I am fundamentally not in agreement with Henryk Goryszewski. Subsequently, we did not raise the issue. That was the first and, let us hope, the last time that I communicated with a member of my government through the medium of television.

[WPROST] Isn't the "Pact of the Enterprise" an attempt to combine "fire with water" by making concessions to both trade unionists and liberals? It may turn out that the government will meet with no support from either employees or employers.

[Suchocka] I think that the essence of democratic politics lies precisely in the art of reconciling conflicting interests. I agree that sometimes attempts have to be made to reconcile fire with water, and, once again, I agree that the pact is precisely such an attempt. But all of us in this government believe that this is a worthwhile attempt because we must seek universal support for reforms in this country, and also because many attempts by my predecessors, warranted as they were, had failed. They failed because they did not meet with broader social acceptance.

[WPROST] You fear that a referendum on abortion might divide the society. But wouldn't penalizing the abortions produce a similar effect? Are you also in favor of penalties for abortion?

[Suchocka] Indeed, I firmly believe that, after so many "wars at the top," a new war, this time "at the bottom," is awaiting us—a war that is even more difficult to end and even more devastating. I fear that, after such a dispute, it would take a long time to revert to thinking in terms of the common good, although that is what we especially need. My government was formed under the slogan "A government of concord," and, at the time, that concerned not only reconciling the bickering political parties. It also concerned building a conciliatory mood throughout the country, a mood of assent to the reforms, concord with the state. After all, the first part of this government's program of action was precisely the "Pact of the Enterprise," whose fundamental intent was to attain social consent to the reform of state

enterprises. But, however difficult it may be to attain, harmony can be easily destroyed.

That is why I am resolutely opposed to a referendum on abortion. I am just as resolutely opposed to abortion. It is a great evil, and we must combat it. But to round out the whole, let me say a third no: I am also opposed to penalties for abortion. Prison does not seem to me the best antidote to the evil of abortion; better approaches should be explored.

[WPROST] To double the GDP [gross domestic product], the growth of consumption should be curtailed for at least the next five years. Would you be ready to pursue this policy even against the opinion of a majority of the public? Opinion polls indicate that people favoring consumption at the expense of economic growth are in the majority.

[Suchocka] I have discussed that in my speech to the Sejm. It is time to think of a future further off than what we have been thinking of so far. After three difficult years, we are finally emerging from the recession. Economic indicators show that our output is rising. For the time being, this is an insignificant rise. I am aware, of course, that, after three years of declining living standards, people are saying that, because we are entering upon a period of growth, personal consumption should be increased as soon as possible. But, on the other hand, if we want to be a genuinely affluent and strong country, we have to think in terms other than "now" or "at once." If we desire a real and tangible growth in consumption, we must invest. If we desire to be a country not diverging radically in its level of growth and affluence from the other European countries, we should not at once consume our—for the time being insignificant—increase in affluence. We must invest part of it in our future. After all, what is obvious on the scale of ordinary family households applies just as well to our common Polish household.

Every zloty we invest well affords an opportunity for further growth. In this way, we can achieve what is called in scholarly language the multiplier effect. That is why I appeal for investing at least one-half of the growth in our gross national product during the next few years. In this way, we have the opportunity of doubling our national income within 10 years and becoming an affluent country like the other European countries. Otherwise, to be sure, next year our personal consumption may increase by about 1.5 percent, but, in three and in nine years, it will still remain at a level unsatisfactory to anyone.

I do not intend to pursue any policy that would be resolutely opposed by a majority of the society. Anyway, that is not possible in a democracy. But I do intend to try to persuade the largest possible segment of the Polish society to share my viewpoint.

Ours is a tremendous responsibility. I could not take the risk of having historians speak 30 years hence of our government as resembling the Saxon times, when Poland forfeited for many years an opportunity to grow and fell to the level of second-class countries in Europe only in order to lose its independence later as a result.

* **WPROST Names Suchocka 'Person of the Year'**
*93EP0151B Warsaw WPROST in Polish No 1,
 3 Jan 93 pp 13-15*

[Unattributed article: "The Prime Minister Walks on a Tightrope"]

[Text] "Why Hanna Suchocka? I think there is no need to explain. "Cinderella!" declared Andrzej Olechowski, an economic adviser to the president, in voting for the prime minister as Person of the Year.

Hanna Suchocka is a law expert, an experienced Sejm deputy, and, before taking the office of head of government, vice chairperson of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Despite all this political activity, she had not previously been a major political figure. "I am an expert, not a politician," as she customarily speaks of herself. She kept aloof from the political games involved in forming the governing coalition, and she never held a government post before. Precisely this, paradoxically enough, proved to be a plus for her candidacy for the office of prime minister. All of the leaders of the coalition parties were either "burned" by having already held posts in government or by being too controversial to their political allies. Suchocka, a member of the Democratic Union, is in favor of maintaining the current direction of the reforms. (That was why, among others, Prof. Leszek Balcerowicz and Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki nominated her for Person of the Year.) In addition, she had signed the draft of the antiabortion law prepared by the ZChN (Christian-National Union). Thus, she has become good "mortar" for binding the ideologically bickering governing coalition.

At first, the principal factor in favor of maintaining her Cabinet was the belief that the possibilities for forming political configurations were exhausted and the collapse of the government would mean earlier elections to the parliament, which would then most likely be dominated by demagogues. At the same time, fear of attack by antireform forces is not strong enough to prevent partisan attitudes.

And yet, "Thanks to Suchocka, political life in Poland is again beginning to make sense," as stated in NEWSWEEK by Andrew Nagorski, the Warsaw correspondent of that weekly, who added that the prime minister "put an end to the chronic political infighting that paralyzed the government, maintained an unlikely coalition of seven parties, faced the strikes, and gained the approbation of 82 percent of Poles."

The concept of Suchocka's government is based on the belief that "combining fire with water" is possible. "We must accept a curtailed growth of personal consumption for the next five years. This means, in practice, that real wages would grow at only one-half the rate of the growth of the GDP [gross domestic product]," Ms. Prime Minister declared, while, at the same time, voicing the belief that she will succeed in gaining the consent of a majority of the public to the curtailment of consumption. If not, she implied, we would be threatened by either chaos or the need

to reform the economy by force. "Except that I do not perceive any such force," said Minister Jacek Kuron (Democratic Union).

Just when it was formed, the new government had to face the first wave of strikes. "Friend Lepper, let us ready the scythes against those bad guys from the government!" appealed Michal Kurek of the OPZZ [All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement]. "We shall not shine the shoes of capitalists, whether native or foreign!" thundered Marian Jurczyk. And the allied trade unions demanded, among other things, the immediate elimination of unemployment and the expulsion of foreign investors.

That first skirmish with the trade unions was won by Suchocka's government, apparently the first time a postwar Polish Government has done so.

That was due, in our opinion, to both the determination of Ms. Prime Minister herself and the differences in the interests of discrete social groups, as it became obvious that raising the wages of blue-collar workers would hurt the salaries of civil servants and meeting all of the demands of the farmers would worsen the situation of consumers. Her success in the struggle against the radical wing of trade unions enabled Hanna Suchocka to claim that "the work place is ceasing to be a haven of work, housing, vacations, and health care," and "the government's responsibility must transcend temporary compromises with various social groups—it must allow for long-range national interests."

Her resoluteness toward the strikers further increased the popularity of the head of government. According to Pentor [Polling Institute], Ms. Prime Minister is the second-most-popular Polish politician, after [Labor Minister] Jacek Kuron and before [Foreign Minister] Krzysztof Skubiszewski. CBOS [Public Opinion Survey Center] polls of November 1992 show that she enjoys the confidence of more than 80 percent of the respondents.

The first wave of strikes turned out to be just a "warm-up" for the next wave, which, it seems to us, will be much more difficult to counter. "Combining fire with water" is all the more difficult for Suchocka, considering that the Council of Ministers sometimes acts like a miniature Sejm. To survive, Ms. Prime Minister must somehow reconcile the oft-conflicting interests of the seven coalition parties and tolerate the considerable autonomy of individual ministers. "I find it difficult to force certain ministers to make decisions. That is difficult when a minister is of the same mind as the strikers instead of acting for the government," Suchocka complained. Perhaps this problem will be eliminated by the Small Constitution. Now "the prime minister has become the official superior of the ministers, and the government has ceased to become a loose confederation of ministries," said Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Liberal-Democratic Congress).

Another difficult task for the prime minister is achieving a consensus among the coalition partners as regards the assumptions of economic policy. According to Deputy Marek Dabrowski, a leading Democratic Union liberal, these assumptions are "a medley of ministerial projects in

the style of former communist planning." In their turn, Donald Tusk's Liberals concluded that the tax increases envisaged in the budget law draft will merely result in curtailing investment, aggravating the recession, and reducing the number of jobs. Besides, even earlier, the Liberals have been voicing their discontent, chiefly about the "Pact of the State Enterprise," which, in their opinion, gives too much power to the trade unions. On the other hand, to Minister Gabriel Janowski (Peasant Party), the government's economic policy is too liberal, and he would like more government intervention in the countryside.

To make things still more difficult, Ms. Prime Minister has to avert ideological clashes while directing the government in a nonpartisan manner. In speaking out against the referendum on punishment for abortion and, at the same time, opposing punishment for women, she was able to calm the nervousness of politicians as reflected most clearly in Deputy Prime Minister Henryk Goryszewski's comment, "The government can also exist without the Democratic Union."

The existing contradictions force Prime Minister Suchocka to pursue a continuous balancing act between progovernment and opposition parties. Being aware of how insignificant is the majority of the governing coalition in the Sejm, for a long time she left open the issue of having the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] or the PC [Center Accord] join the government bloc, which was supported by, among others, Minister Artur Balazs (Peasant-Christian Party). Only sharp opposition from Jaroslaw Kaczynski and the threat of a conflict with the president, toward whom her attitude is quite flexible, ended the speculations on this topic. Another time, fed up by the demands of Gabriel Janowski, she met with Waldemar Pawlak, the chairman of the PSL, Janowski's rival. Only after Janowski's party was (the next morning) classified among the "constructive opposition" and his "pro-state thinking" lauded did she meet in the evening with the leadership of that party. The popularity she has won as prime minister is also enabling her to strengthen her standing within her own party, the Democratic Union, the more so considering that the Conservative Party, headed by Aleksander Hall, had unofficially asked her to change her party affiliation.

[Box, p 14]

Witold Zaraska, chairman of the board of the Exbud Joint-Stock Company:

Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka most greatly influenced public life in Poland in 1952. Owing to her personality and life-style, she was able to win over public opinion, although the decisions she has been making are not always popular.

Wojciech Kruk, senator, businessman:

I guess Ms. Prime Minister has the right to be Person of the Year somewhat on credit. I said "on credit," but I am certain that she will justify it. Compared with the apathy of the previous government, Ms. Prime Minister succeeded in rapidly rebuilding Poland's credibility on the international

scene and inspiring Poles with a little optimism. The success of this government will also be our success.

Andrzej Smorawinski, businessman:

Ms. Prime Minister should be Person of the Year. The style of action she represents has a calming effect on public mood. She knows how to defuse and calm nascent tensions. Her life-style confirms the opinion that she is the First Lady of the Republic.

Jacek Kuron, minister of labor and social welfare:

My first thought was that I should be Person of the Year. After all, every individual is the protagonist of the year he lives through. But, on second thought, I concluded that Hanna Suchocka deserves most to be Person of the Year, and, after her, Zbigniew Bujak.

The Rev. Prof. Jozef Tischner, philosopher:

I support Ms. Hanna Suchocka because, in general, I support women, and her in particular.

[Box, p 15]

Hanna Suchocka was born 42 years ago into a pharmacist family in Pleszewo, Wielkopolska. In 1968 she completed law studies at Mickiewicz University in Poznan. After she taught there for a year, her contract was not renewed because she was not a Communist Party member. In 1969, she joined the Democratic Party, started to work at the Institute of Small Industry and Handicrafts, and trained as a legal adviser.

In 1972, she returned to teach at Mickiewicz University, at the Chair of Constitutional Law, and, in 1982, she began to lecture at the Catholic University in Lublin. In 1975, she defended her doctoral dissertation. She specialized in teaching constitutional law, the rights of man, the rights of national minorities, and public law. She had studied those subjects at Columbia University, at the Institute of the Rights of Man in Strassbourg, and at the Institute of Public Law in Heidelberg. She is fluent in French, English, and German.

In the years 1980-85, she served as a Democratic Party deputy to the Sejm. One of the "mutinous," she voted against the martial law decree, the outlawing of Solidarity, a repressive penal code, and the law on proceedings against work shirkers. For her opposition to the outlawing of Solidarity, she was suspended from Democratic Party membership. In 1984 she resigned from that party in disagreement with the undemocratic electoral law. Since 1980, she has been a member of Solidarity, cooperating in her capacity as a legal expert with the Sociopolitical Research Center of the Wielkopolska Solidarity Region Board.

In the 1989 election, she stood for the Sejm as a member of Walesa's team and won 72 percent of the votes. She became a member of the OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club] presidium, a vice chairperson of the Legislative Committee, and a member of the Constitutional Committee and the National and Ethnic Minorities Committee. She was

reelected to the Second Sejm with the support of Democratic Union, on winning in Poznan the second-largest number of votes after Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

As a popular deputy and one respected for "competence, efficiency, and industriousness," she became the chairperson of the Polish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and later a vice chairperson of that Council itself.

Within the Democratic Union, she was a sympathizer of Aleksander Hall's [conservative] faction. In the FPD (Forum of the Democratic Right), it was thought that she should become the chairman of the KPUD [Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Union], in place of Prof. Bronislaw Geremek. Together with the FPD, she supported the Senate draft law on the legal protection of children. To ZChN (Christian-National Union) deputies, she was the sole acceptable Democratic Union candidate for the premiership, in view of her ostentations "Catholic attitude." On 10 July 1992, 233 deputies voted in favor of her becoming the prime minister.

*** Polish Satellite TV Reviewed, Updated**
93EP0154A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (Saturday supplement) in Polish 2-3 Jan 93 p 7

[Article by Franciszek Skwierawski: "From Weronica Street to Outer Space"]

[Text] The inauguration of Polish Satellite TV is rapidly approaching; it is scheduled for 31 March 1993.

"Performances" in outer space were rehearsed in September 1992 by using the international program "Mosaic"; in October, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of Polish Television; and, most recently, at Christmas (24 December, from 1600 to 2400, and 25 December, from 0900 to 0245).

On the occasion of that last program, a glossy folder was published—for some unknown reason, in the English language. In the days preceding the holiday broadcast, a commercial for the Polish satellite television program was shown repeatedly on the television screens, unfortunately with errors.

It was reported that the Polish program would be broadcast through the mediation of EUTELSAT II, but that is not the name of any particular satellite but, rather, of the second generation of EUTELSAT, for which satellite stations operate at 7, 10, 13, and 16 degrees east longitude, with "ours" being EUTELSAT II at 16 degrees longitude. The commercial also said that X-polarization should be chosen. There is no such polarization; there are only two polarizations: V, or vertical, and H, or horizontal.

Fallow Land

The young and inexperienced management of Polish Satellite TV, which is only beginning to learn, must arm itself with patience and realize the hardly consoling truth that the Polish satellite channel will gain viewers arduously and with difficulty. It will not be like Poland's Channels 1 and 2, where any attractive program will rapidly win an audience,

because they have millions of viewers. In this new domain represented by satellite transmission, we are only starting down the road.

All the more so, aspects of audience development, both in this country and abroad, should not be minimized. This new satellite channel will hardly show foreign films (purchasing licenses for entire Europe is extremely expensive), but it can be a valuable complement to the two Polish national channels. In those regions of Poland that neither Channel 1 nor Channel II has reached (4 percent and 23 percent, respectively), thanks to satellite television, people will finally be able, after 40 years of the existence of Polish television, to view Edyta Wojtczak and Jan Suzin on their screens. That is hard to believe but true. There are such areas in Poland.

Polonia—Polish Satellite TV is commencing its activities on an exceptionally fallow field, so to speak.

Viewers, both domestic and foreign, will have to be waited for because conventional antennas will not do. Users of cable television in buildings equipped for this purpose will be the first to watch satellite television. The incorporation of this channel in the cable network will present no big difficulty and is required by the regulations governing satellite television in Poland.

Users of discrete sets adapted to the ASTRA system will not be as well off. To receive EUTELSAT II programs, they will have to spend approximately 2 million zlotys each on a power unit for remote control of the antenna or on a double set of converters.

Foreign viewers of the Polish satellite channel will be in an even worse situation. They will absolutely have to acquire an individual reception set with a roof- or balcony-installed antenna, which cannot be accomplished as freely as in Poland, because, in the other countries, it is said that the satellite dish uglifies urban architecture. As for incorporating the Polish channel in foreign cable networks, that will be no easy matter.

How did satellite television perform on those two days of Christmas?

The fare was carefully composed, as planned. It included a newscast, "Wiadomosci," of course, and, as befitting Christmas, a large number of Christmas carols presented by the head himself of the Television Information Agency, Jaroslaw Gugala, including a carol sung by the lovely Mazowsze Ballet dancers, an "On the Niemen River" serial, a portrait of Krystyna Janda, and many other excellent shows. That fare could be to the liking of our Poles abroad.

Telephones Ringing Like Crazy

The management of Polish Satellite TV has unfortunately neglected to properly promote and advertise this new important program initiative. Nothing has changed at state television on Weronica Street. But then, after all, the introduction and the broadcasting of this new channel are financed by government money—that is, with our money, meaning nobody's money.

The Viewers' Liaison office (telephone number 43-33-23), when asked which newspaper was publishing the schedule for the new channel, could not provide an answer. Instead, it referred me to the management of the Satellite Program, telephone number 47-62-11, where, as befitting a holiday, a message recorder was on. After broadcasting began at 1600 (without prior showing of a control image), the number of a special duty telephone was given, but it was silent for at least the first hour. There, too, no information could be gleaned about any newspaper that was publishing the channel schedule, but I received assurances that such information had been released to the press. Could it be that all of the newspapers and periodicals, including ANTENNA, the publication of the Radio Committee, and the country's only television monthly, TV SAT MAGAZINE, had entered into a sworn conspiracy of silence against Polish Satellite TV? The schedule was certainly distributed to the press after it was too late to publish it, after the newspapers had already been printed, when it could only be written in by hand at the newsstands.

It turned out that GAZETA WYBORCZA was just about the only newspaper to publish the holiday schedule for satellite television, but under the heading "POLSAT," which many readers associated with the private Wroclaw channel SATPOL, instead of under the heading "Polonia Polish TV."

The Radio Committee, which collects hundreds of billions of zlotys in advertising revenue, does not itself know how to properly advertise its new program.

Besides, why advertise something that does not need advertising? As the presenters assured us, this program was "viewed by a crowd," "the telephones rang like crazy," and, supposedly, there were callers from all over Europe. But, at the same time, it was explained to us that viewers discovered this program by chance, which conflicts with the claim that it was viewed by very many. Thus, they were individual

searchers through the satellite sky, equipped with remote-control antennas—that is, as during the first broadcast in honor of the 40th anniversary of television.

It is not surprising because it cannot be otherwise. After all, we are not dealing with the traditional ground-based broadcasting system, to which the 10 million Polish antennas are adapted. Every beginning is difficult. In 1938, the first feature-length film was broadcast to five television viewers, and, in 1952, the inauguration of a channel was viewed on 24 screens. We should not thus be told that the Polish channel was "viewed by a crowd," that Europe held its breath on beholding Polish television.

The most popular European satellite channel, MTV, boasts that it is watched from the Urals to the Atlantic by 100 million viewers. If that is true, its European version took several years to accomplish that, and its American version, some 15 or so years. It should also be borne in mind that MTV in one day spends as much money on its operating expenses as is spent by all of Polish television in a month.

There is no doubt that we have been tardy in beginning satellite television, even despite our poverty, considering that not only West Europe, of course, is using it but also Russia, Croatia, and Hungary already.

The activation of satellite television broadcasting on Woronicza Street is a project resembling the previous commencement of the production of Fiat cars—and soon now of Ford cars—at the Zeran Passenger Cars Factory, in the sense that it also requires improved technical quality and, let us hope, improved general quality also. It should be realized that Polish television is now being widely watched abroad, where the quality of spoken words may be difficult to evaluate but the quality of the picture is not.

To cope with the new challenges of television technology and the requirements of a new order in the ether, good weather for professionals should finally reign on Woronicza Street.

*** Borbely on Autonomy, Relations With Opposition**

93BA0449A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 23 Dec 92 p 3

[MTI report on 22 December 1992 article in the Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO by Imre Borbely, a leader of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania: "Two Stages to Autonomy"]

[Text] The Tuesday issue of ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO, in its rubric "Point of View," published excerpts from representative Imre Borbely's lengthy essay entitled "Some Aspects of the Kolozsvar [Cluj] Declaration of the RMDSZ [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania]." In this essay, the prominent personage from the radical wing of the RMDSZ puts forward his ideas about the "necessity of the self-determination of the Hungarian ethnic community in Romania" and "two possible agendas" to achieve it, in which he assigns a considerable role to the January RMDSZ conference in Brasso [Brasov].

The publication of the essay is expected to generate a strong response within the RMDSZ as it is preparing for the conference. The moderate wing of the Union has always cautioned against endangering the connections which it had established with the Romanian democratic opposition and the practical positions it had achieved. Just on Monday President Iliescu stated that he considered ideas of ethnic and territorial autonomy to be unconstitutional, and the forces of the Romanian opposition also either politely distanced themselves from the Kolozsvar Declaration or, for the most part, sharply criticized it themselves.

Following Imre Borbely's argumentation, the two basic stages of internal self-determination, i.e., a political resolution and the declaration of intent ("which one only had to dare") were accomplished by the Kolozsvar Declaration by the National Council of Delegates on 25 October. For further stages, preliminary coordination and a decision by the conference will be necessary. He stressed that personal and cultural autonomy are necessary for the preservation of the identity of Hungarians in Transylvania. He does not regard economic autonomy as realistic.

According to Imre Borbely, "because of imaginary or real constitutional obstacles," two ways present themselves to realize all the above. One way is to bring everything to a successful completion at once, "in one step," "regardless of what individual political forces consider to be constitutional"; although this forced march "is imaginable, it is not advisable."

The other way has two stages. The elements which in his opinion do not conflict with the Constitution in any way would be realized in the first stage (registration of the Hungarians in Romania; drawing up lists of nominees for elections; self-government of the Hungarian ethnic community created by general and secret Hungarian elections; the establishment of the executive branch; the establishment of Hungarian cultural autonomy; the association of local Hungarian self-governments).

The forms of autonomy, which "according to some" conflict with the present Constitution, are the subject of the second stage. These are: Hungarian territorial autonomy, and the status of a partner nation for the Hungarians.

The accomplishment of the first stage, Imre Borbely writes, presupposes an intermediate structure to be approved by the Third Conference, which is going to be held in the middle of January in Brasso, as well as a target program to develop the structure of self-government.

In another part of his essay, the Temesvar [Timisoara] RMDSZ politician points out that earlier the RMDSZ made several concessions in order to improve the chances of the Romanian democratic opposition. For instance, it postponed its conference till after the elections; it suppressed the autonomy-study by Jozsef Csapo, a member of the presidium known for his very radical views; and it did not participate in the World Congress of Transylvania Hungarians. However, in Imre Borbely's opinion, after the elections, postponing the discussion about and the declaration of self-determination can no longer be justified.

Imre Borbely believes that the chances of realization can be increased by a "Hungarian will," the self-organization of Hungarians through the RMDSZ; by, as he explains, an "interest shared by Romanians and Hungarians" to provide a perspective for the Hungarians in Romania that encourages them to stay and, at the same time, does not endanger Romania's territorial integrity; and finally, by the foreign political environment. As an important element of the latter he states that in Western European political circles, internal self-determination is being regarded as an increasingly accepted solution to settle the problems of ethnic minorities. Another important element is the Russian-Hungarian cooperation because, as he writes, Russia found itself in a position similar to that of Hungary by virtue of the fact that 25 million Russians have become minorities. And because the largest Hungarian ethnic group decided on internal self-determination by issuing the Kolozsvar Declaration, in the author's opinion "this will most probably determine the relevant policy of the mother country, as well."

* **Principles of Slovak Citizenship Law Revealed**
93CH0240A Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 18 Dec 92
p 2

[Interview with Milan Secansky, chairman of the Slovak parliament's constitutional committee, by Stefan Hrcka; place and date not given: "Fears Are Not Warranted"]

[Text] *For several days, the draft of the law on citizenship of the Czech Republic has been a topic of discussion west (and not only west) of the Morava River. However, many of our readers also want some information about the planned law on citizenship of the Slovak Republic. We asked Milan Secansky, chairman of the constitutional committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, on which principles this law will be based.*

[Secansky] The draft of the citizenship law of the Slovak Republic has not been quite completed.

The draft of the Czech law proceeds from the alien principle—in other words, from the principle that a person must be a citizen of only one state. Basically, it means that individuals wishing to become citizens of the Czech Republic must renounce their previous citizenship.

Unlike the Czech system, the draft of the law planned for Slovakia does not prevent people from holding dual citizenship—Slovak and Czech or any other—according to each citizen's personal decision. Let us suppose that an Italian citizen gets married in Slovakia. If she chooses, she may obtain Slovak citizenship while retaining her Italian citizenship. We would never exclude such cases.

However, the greatest problems involve the drafting of a legal amendment by which we intend to make it possible for Slovaks who live abroad to hold both citizenship of the state in which they reside and Slovak citizenship.

[PRAVDA] What do the problems involve?

[Secansky] In this instance, our laws are not enough. The legal code of the pertinent state must provide for dual citizenship. If the legal code of some state does not recognize dual citizenship, the citizen who resides there must decide whether he or she wants the citizenship of that state or our citizenship. We recommend that such cases be settled by international agreements.

[PRAVDA] Approximately 50,000 citizens with only Czech citizenship reside in Slovakia. They are afraid of what will happen to them if the citizenship law of the Slovak Republic is not adopted by the time the federation is dissolved.

[Secansky] If anyone who is not a Slovak citizen has permanent residence in Slovakia, he or she will be free to apply for Slovak citizenship and still retain his or her original citizenship. This applies to citizens of the Czech Republic and of any other state. I can assure those people that all of their fears are not warranted. I would advise them to stay calm and wait for the adoption of the new citizenship law of the Slovak Republic.

* **Ignac Behul on His Committee's Tasks, Activities**
93CH0240B Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 18 Dec 92
p 5

[Interview with Ignac Behul, director of the Bureau for the Protection of Economic Interests, by Ivan Podstupka; place and date not given: "Corrupt Economy—Threat to Democracy"]

[Text] *Stealing from the state has always been widespread, but its current extent is unprecedented. The period of relaxation and liberalization offers a convenient climate for conmen, smugglers, and tax evaders. This stratum has developed links to political circles on the one hand, and to the criminal underworld on the other. It poses a threat not only to the economy but also to a democratic development of our society. We discussed with Lieutenant Colonel Ignac Behul, director of the Bureau for the Protection of Economic Interests of the Slovak Republic, what our state is doing for its protection.*

[Behul] Pursuant to the law on the Police Corps of the Slovak Republic, No. 204/1991 of the Collection of Laws, the task of our bureau is to obtain, collect, and evaluate information that is relevant for the protection of the economic interests of the Slovak Republic. It serves the National Council of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Slovak Republic as a basis for decisions of long-term and conceptual issues. In individual cases, we also share information with other state agencies. We obtain basic data and information from the state and other agencies, from communities, organizations, and persons, who are obliged to submit it to us promptly. However, no one can be forced to provide information under a threat of psychological or physical coercion. To obtain important information, the bureau is authorized to use specific designated funds.

[PRAVDA] Do you mean by that, for instance, wiretapping?

[Behul] Yes, I do. If legal provisions are met and a court permit exists, the bureau may use technical information means, among them wiretapping and the recording of telecommunications traffic. That is what we do in justified cases.

[PRAVDA] In what way does the Bureau for the Protection of Economic Interests of the Slovak Republic differ from police investigation of economic crimes?

[Behul] Our bureau's operations and authorization have broader specifications and exceed the framework of criminal acts because acts that may endanger or damage our economic interests do not necessarily have to be of a criminal type. The criminal police protect property, investigate criminal acts, identify their perpetrators, and search for evidence for the prosecution. In simple terms, their operations are linked to the prosecution.

[PRAVDA] Your bureau is one of the institutions that are not topics of extensive discussion and publicity. It is not subject to public social control. That is understandable. That follows from the type of its activities. To whom is it accountable for its operations?

[Behul] The UOEZ [Bureau for the Protection of Economic Interests] of the Slovak Republic is an independent, specific service of the Interior Ministry. It was organized by the Minister of the Interior of the Slovak Republic. The National Council of the Slovak Republic appoints from among its deputies a special supervisory agency to control UOEZ operations. The bureau must submit to it background materials that control the use of specific measures, including technical means. In addition to other rights, the control agency can request background materials and receive continuous information about the bureau's operations and a summary annual report.

[PRAVDA] The privatization program has brought about several processes that are on the border of the law or exceed its limits. It may be presumed that this has kept the bureau quite busy....

[Behul] In their ultimate consequences, the negative phenomena that occurred and are still taking place in the process of the transformation of ownership relations are hurting the economy of the Slovak Republic. Our bureau attentively followed the programs of minor as well as major privatization. We collected a great amount of data about small privatization, primarily about the rigging of auctions. Special-interest groups were formed by individuals who operated in auction halls and rigged the procedures at the auctions. Those groups would often show little interest in managing the enterprises they obtained; they either lease or sell them at a profit. Furthermore, lucrative production units have been auctioned off by the so-called Dutch method, let us say, at 20 percent of their listed price. The data we have gathered and then submitted to appropriate authorities helped in the drafting of amendments to pertinent legal regulations.

In fact, we did observe certain negative impacts also in the major privatization process—in all of its forms. Individual IPF's [investment privatization funds] had merged formally and informally in order to gain a control package in individual corporations. We have determined that there existed interrelations between IPF personnel and the managements of privatized corporations, in whose holding the state has retained a share. Regulations on the conditions for direct sales and for the submission of competing privatized units have been violated. Participants in the program of privatization exerted pressure on legal experts in order to have the value of capital investment artificially reduced; long-term assets were leased at token prices. There were frequent instances of special-interest manipulations by enterprise managements, which created an impression that the enterprises had no long-range prospects so that long-term assets could be privatized at cut rates. Instances where the projections for privatization were flawed on purpose were not exceptional; then the competing plans by persons connected with the enterprise management could be given priority.

[PRAVDA] Are you also protecting the interests of private entrepreneurs?

[Behul] If their operations are in conformity with the interests of Slovakia's economy, we protect them as well. An example may be our disclosures of illegal cartel agreements

by which manufacturers or merchants intended to divide the markets and fix prices in order to drive out smaller companies from the market.

[PRAVDA] Your first and foremost task is to generalize processes that damage Slovakia's economy. Undoubtedly, you do so on the basis of specific cases. Could you name some of them?

[Behul] Naturally, I cannot speak about operations that are currently under investigation, that are "alive." However, I can mention some interesting cases involving the penetration of foreign capital. Some foreign so-called entrepreneurs are aware that the Slovak economy is hungry for investments, and they want to turn that to their own advantage. For instance, in late 1991 and early 1992, the Swedish Punkten AB Company wanted to acquire a preferential right to build the so-called Swedish industrial villages. Our bureau found out that the company was not solvent and that all it intended was to get hold of large areas of land at a low cost. In addition, our public should be reminded of the already somewhat notorious case where Nigerian companies tried to transfer large financial funds to foreign banks through our commercial companies. They offered a 30-percent commission for that transaction. At the same time, they demanded receipted blank invoices and company stationery. They abused the good reputation of our companies and engaged in commercial transactions to the detriment of our organizations. Noteworthy are the programs of a certain Spanish company that invited the representatives of our enterprises and organizations to Spain to accept its "International Gold Star for Quality" award. Then it demanded that every honored participant pay \$2,300 for the three-hour program, dinner, the "gold star" statuette, and one night's lodging. The criteria according to which those awards were granted remain a mystery for the honorees. It is no surprise that profit for the organizers was the only motivation for that undertaking.

* Unity of Hungarians in Slovakia Seen Increasing

93CH0277A Budapest MAGYAR FORUM in Hungarian 17 Dec 92 p 7

[Unattributed article: "Hungarian Unity Is Taking Shape"]

[Text] The "bright days" of the Hungarians in the Felvidek ["Upper Country"—northern Hungary until 1920, now Slovakia] were being mentioned in Budapest at the beginning of December, at the political forum organized jointly by the Rakoczi Association and the Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Society under the title "The Situation of the Hungarian Minority in Slovakia," and at the regular annual meeting of the Rakoczi Association where the text of the association's statement was approved.

The political forum's real sensation was that the four political parties of the Hungarians in the Felvidek jointly and severally expressed their standpoint regarding the situation that will arise with the establishment of independent

Slovak statehood, a situation in which it will be necessary to formulate the strategy of the Hungarian political parties and of the ethnic Hungarians.

The annual meeting of the Rakoczi Association heard and debated the report for 1992 that was presented by the association's outgoing general secretary, Laszlo Gondocs, who has resigned. In the heated debate not devoid of occasionally flaring tempers, the participants attempted to clarify the views and standpoints—held respectively by the Hungarian political leaders who had been driven out from the country of their birth and those who have remained in the Felvidek—regarding the most important strategic questions affecting the ethnic Hungarians.

We will be reverting to the events themselves at a later date. On this occasion we merely wish to summarize the most important pronouncements made during the two days.

The first speaker to address the forum was Miklos Duray, president of the Coexistence Political Movement. He emphasized that it is essential for the Hungarians of the Felvidek to be politically prepared for the sudden change in their fortune that will occur with the rebirth of Slovak statehood as of 1 January. The process that has been in progress for two years will evidently create also new tensions, and we must strive to gain acceptance as a partner nation.

Pal Farkas, president of the [Hungarian] Christian Democratic People's Party, reviewed the history of Slovak national revival. He emphasized that the isolation of a Slovakia regaining its independence cannot be in the interest of the ethnic Hungarians. It is far more important to aid Slovakia. Just as in 1939, statehood is again being created without consulting the people. But that does not free us of the obligation to help them [the Slovaks] adapt to European standards.

Laszlo Nagy, president of the Hungarian Civic Party, called attention to the fact that the purpose of December conference to be held in Leva [Levice] will be to devise a new strategy for the ethnic Hungarians.

Gyula Popely, president of the Hungarian People's Party, emphasized that he was attending the Budapest conference not as a party politician, but as a Hungarian, at a time when the stakes in daily political struggle were the life and existence of the ethnic Hungarians, and their right to survive. Up to now the ethnic Hungarians of the Felvidek had sought, consistently and indefatigably, opportunities for rapprochement with the country's other ethnic groups. The ethnic Hungarians also believed in the so-called velvet revolution, yet they now have nothing besides their "right to growl."

The speeches by the politicians arriving from the Felvidek did not betray any particular optimism, yet they reinforced the audience's impression that the unity of the various Hungarian political forces was maturing. The way Miklos Duray put it was that perhaps there might even be some sort of fusion of the Hungarian political forces, the parties. That prediction met with undivided approval. In the same

manner, at the Rakoczi Association's annual meeting special emphasis was placed on uniting the ethnic Hungarians in the Felvidek.

*** Minac's TV Eulogy of Dubcek Criticized**

93CH0238A Bratislava *KULTURNY ZIVOT* in Slovak
25 Nov 92 pp 1-2

[Commentary by Jan Grexa: "Anticipation of Interrelations"]

[Text] On the tear-stained Saturday evening of 14 November 1992, a bard appeared on the television screen to read a eulogy for Alexander Dubcek, who was (and this is an approximate quotation) a simple man, yet one of the greatest Slovak political figures, Slovakia's most outstanding citizen of the world at this time, a man whose goodness of heart was regarded by many as weakness—and that, in politics, is a punishable offense. Thus, he was punished, says Vladimir Minac, because he is the one of whom we speak. Only tangentially do we learn by whom Dubcek was punished: by the vindictive and vengeful front of the aggressive Czech political faction, which repaid him for his kind words by distorting his own history, and for his attempts at conciliation by spouting threats in his face because he was a Slovak and because, as Minac contends, Alexander Dubcek's historical greatness is typically Slovak; it is the kind of greatness that does not use arms. Obviously, only non-Slovaks would "stab and slash to make blood flow" [reference to a 1939 fascist song], while we are trotting with our olive branch all over the world. In fact, is it not true that his compatriots in his native town of Uhrovec booed Dubcek because of his endorsement of Czechoslovak statehood? What a pity that such a moving eulogy was marred by his coffin draped in the postfederal flag. Oh, Sasha, you should not have done that to Vladimir!

Minac continues: Dubcek probably could not fully comprehend modern correlations of history. After all, he was a simple man, according to the author, who is not a simple man, who understood those correlations in the past and still understands them, and who adds, as though speaking about himself: Even the most brilliant intellectual gifts and talents may easily go to waste, as we can often see almost every day in our country....

Because we already know who punished Dubcek, let us mention the reason. To find exact quotations, I really do not feel like going over the glorious *Poucenie z krizoveho vyvoja v strane a spolocnosti po XII. zjazde KSC* [Lessons from the Development of Crisis in the Party and Society After the 12th Congress of the CPCZ (Czechoslovak Communist Party)], approved by the plenary session of the CPCZ Central Committee in December 1970. That plenum, full of righteous determination and allegiance to communist principles, condemned Dubcek as the prime representative of the right-wing opportunist forces within the party's leadership, as the one who had implemented unprincipled policies, insisted on nonclass and anti-internationalist declarations and sabotaged the Moscow protocols; consequently, his removal from the office of first secretary of the CPCZ

Central Committee was a precondition for the most genuine consolidation and normalization of the situation.

Let us add a random note—namely, that Vladimir Minac was also among the members of that same CPCZ Central Committee. He was hardly just any card-holding party member (1968-71). He served at the same time as a deputy in the Chamber of the People at the Federal Assembly (1969-71) and, from 1971 until the collapse of the party's leading role, as a member of the Central Committee of the CPSL [Communist Party of Slovakia]. He would not have received the Labor Award (1968), the Red Banner Award (1974), and the title of National Artist (1975) if he had not raised his hand....

Thus far, I have frequently dipped my pen in Minac's inkwell, and I shall continue to do the same for a while, to quote from his *Suvislosti* [Connections], even at the risk of being charged with selective choice of connections. By that I mean that I have worn out my edition of Minac's selected works because, during the years of the totalitarian system, I would happily and frequently reach for them. However, at a certain moment, Minac ceased to suit my taste. It may be my own fault; I may have perverse fads, but I dislike his curve of progression from militant internationalism to still more militant nationalism. Indeed: "Certainly, it is everyone's duty to progress, but some people, instead of progressing, instantly yield to every change in atmospheric pressure. And that is not good." (*Suvislosti. Piseme sucasnikom* [Connections, We Write to Our Contemporaries], Slovensky spisovatel Publishing House, 1976, p. 471.)

I do not consider it right for any pre-November member of the CPSL's Central Committee to turn so fast into a follower of Dubcek and an expert on Dubcek, and usurp a historical prerogative to justify Dubcek because "it is true that history sometimes, and quite often, treats certain personalities unfairly; by the same token, however, history constantly works to render a final, and therefore fair, portrait of personality." (*Portrety* [Portraits], SMENA 1986, p. 21.) In his *Portrety*, Minac presents several portraits, including those of Husak, Colotka, and Chnoupek, but never a word about Dubcek. Of course, he would have to remain silent about him unless he wanted to smear him; in fact, he did occasionally assume a stance worthy of Slovak writer Jan Francisci to protest against the malice of the world and of the CPSL and the CPCZ as "an ox under a yoke, who remembers that he could have been a bull." (*Suvislosti. Duchanie do pahrieb* [Correlations, Fanning the Embers], p. 104). He sure acted like a young bullock—just look at his

endorsement of Gorbachev's perestroyka, which the lords of the castle did not like to see—but he always managed to get back under the yoke just in time "in the name of the one in whose name all revolts are crushed, in the name of the future." (Ibidem, p. 110) With his membership in the Central Committee and his administration of the Matica organization, his future was nothing to spit at. After all: "Freedom could not be shared by all; it was an extremely precious commodity, and, therefore, it should be consistently shared by at least the chosen ones." (Ibidem, p. 119). Isn't it an artist's privilege to be a chosen one?

I do not know why Minac, a Slovak, has become so aggressive; as I mentioned, I do not read him. However, it seems to me that he had turned so "partly because of his love for his nation, and particularly because of his hatred of foreign hands and foreign hearths." (Ibidem, p. 108) He may be entitled to hate foreign hands—in other words, those bare hands that toppled his pedestal on 17 November and thus prevented him from becoming, in his lifetime, an elder statesman and a legendary rebellious member of the Central Committee. But that is his problem, and, if I have ever misjudged him, I want to apologize to him in advance.

I have never claimed, nor do I claim now, that former and current communists, including party officials, should not write or speak in public. However, on this occasion, Vladimir Minac should have remained silent. It may not have been his idea to write the eulogy anonymously; he might not have expressed any desire to pay a tribute to a truly great Slovak. It is possible that he, an effective orator, had been invited to appear on Slovak television by the same newly rising robust forces that stick to the principle of "letting bygones be bygones," so long as we are not Czechs or their domestic toadies. However, even in that case, Minac should have refused. It is unseemly to hold the text of the eulogy in the same hand that was raised in approval of Dubcek's political lynching. That error was far more serious than the "*Omyly Katariny Lazarovej*" [Errors of Katarina Lazarova], about which he wrote that it was an "unseemly defeat" and that the way its author revealed her weak spots had already stretched the limits of decency in literature.

Unless we stop feeling ashamed and begin to exert this kind of ethical control over ourselves, in a year or so Vasil Bilak himself may come up with a eulogy for Alexander Dubcek. After all, he is well versed in orations on 7 November [anniversary of the October Revolution] and can repeat how sad he is that Dubcek did not live long enough to see the Slovak state....

Bratislava, 15 November 1992

Macedonia

* Macedonian Church Official on SPC 'Provocation'

93BA0435A *Skopje VECER* in Macedonian
19-20 Dec 92 pp 4-5

[Article by Branko Gjorgjevski, including interview with Archbishop Timotej, secretary of the Holy Pontifical Synod of the Macedonian Orthodox Church; place and date of interview not given: "Assembling a Mosaic of Evil"]

[Text] *Archbishop Timotej, secretary of the Holy Pontifical Synod of the MPC [Macedonian Orthodox Church], on the latest provocation of the SPC [Serbian Orthodox Church].*

The reason for the latest resolution is the Greater Serbia political background, which is expansionistic in nature.

The cliches and methods are identical to those used in the other areas where war broke out.

Serbian policy and the Serbian Orthodox Church are committing the same evil.

Recently the Macedonian Orthodox Church was given a new kiss from Judas from its "sisterly" orthodox church. Evangelical love and its spreading, which should essentially be the mission of any church, has clearly turned into something entirely opposite in the latest act of the Pontifical Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox Church "to assign an administrator of Macedonian parishes."

Bearing in mind the past rulings of the SPC regarding the status of the Macedonian Orthodox Church, specifically in terms of the proclamation of its autocephalic nature, this step comes as no surprise. What is unexpected is that it comes at a time directly preceding the first talks between the two churches (after a 30-year interval), when the impression was that the freeze in reciprocal relations had begun to thaw, with a possibility of resolving this problem in the future.

Following the steps taken by the SPC, however, the question is whether such a climate surrounding the discussions can continue, because in practical terms the issue has been pushed back to the start, and even farther behind that. What causes the difficulty is the current atmosphere in which the spiritual leadership of the "celestial nation" adopts a resolution that could be described as anything one wishes other than "accidental." It is precisely concerning the background and objective of such a resolution that we spoke with Archbishop Timotej, secretary of the SAS [Holy Synod of Bishops] and administrator of the Debar Kicevo MPC Parish.

[Timotej] We cannot escape the thought that standing behind that resolution of the SPC Assembly is a Greater Serbian political ulterior motive that in its essence is expansionistic and has nothing in common with the sacred New Testament preached by all Christian churches, including the Serbian and Macedonian Orthodox Churches. What is most likely is that the SPC Assembly feared the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia and, joining

Greece, has tried to hurt even worse the living body of Macedonia and the Macedonian Orthodox Church.

Duels in Kalista

[Gjorgjevski] The resolution concerning the "administrator of parishes in Macedonia" comes along with accusations that the "Serbs are righteous," and talk of 300,000 Serbs in Macedonia, the proclamation of a "Vardar Banovina...." Is the SPC merely supporting current Serbian policy?

[Timotej] In principle, Serbian policy and the Serbian Orthodox Church are not generally separate, for they have issued a joint memorandum that is, in practical terms, a joint evil. They function hand in hand in the area of daily policies and with the current authorities. As to whether preparations are being made for war, as the final act of this "overture" and as the final piece in the mosaic they are putting together, they know more about this than we do. In any case, the cliches and methods they use are identical to those they used in the other areas where war broke out.

[Gjorgjevski] Whether and to what extent does a Christian orthodox church dare to assume such a role and "mission"?

[Timotej] In addition to its educational and evangelical role, the church must take care of its own people and other areas of its life, not becoming part of or seeking the advice of any political group, whether national or neutral. Wherever its nation is threatened or has a certain need, it is entirely justifiable for that church to help its children. This has been done by virtually all churches during exceptionally difficult times. Nothing else is worthy of support. At one point, as we looked at the situation, I said that the war being waged in former Yugoslav areas is not a war based on religion. However, it is necessary to emphasize that, in addition to ethnic grounds, religious affiliation plays a role as well. Still, it will be incorrect to say that the war is being waged exclusively on the basis of religious beliefs.

[Gjorgjevski] After the discussions held in Kalista and Belgrade between high-ranking representatives of the two churches, the impression was that things are changing. Is this view now to be held in a state of suspension?

[Timotej] In any case, this resolution is unexpected at a time when the SAS and the MPC were expecting to continue the initiated discussions. What has developed now goes beyond the possibilities that, to some extent, had not been defined, although they had been alluded in the public announcement issued at that time. The resolution in itself indicates an ignorant approach toward anything Macedonian, anything related to St. Kliment, and the results of the activities of the Macedonian Orthodox Church.

[Gjorgjevski] Could such a step by the Serbian side could have been anticipated in the course of the discussions, perhaps even in the form of threats or an ultimatum?

[Timotej] Nothing of the sort occurred in the course of the discussions or was mentioned as a thought. On the contrary, their side had a very positive view of the activities of the MPC, not motivated by courtesy but by the facts. Even Amfilohije Radovic, the archbishop of Montenegro, said

that "what the MPC had acquired it had not only preserved but even improved." Thus, starting with three parishes it now has nine, and a cadre of bishops trained to deal with the contemporary challenges of our new times. All of this is in favor of holy orthodoxy.

[Gjorgjevski] Actually, what was the topic of discussions in Kalista? Little of the essence of the talks was made public.

[Timotej] The discussions were not all that simple and smooth. Their nature was known: a demand that the MPC resume its autonomous status within the framework of the SPC, as was the case before 1958. Even on the basis of such a return, discussions would be held concerning the future and relations between the two churches. On our side, this was rejected out of hand, immediately. Then the other side suggested something else: Would we discuss any other option as long as it is not "autocephalic"? Once again this was rejected by our side, for we did not dare to abandon the demand for autocephalic status. This was followed by going back into history—personalities and events—which, in a certain manner, looked like an effort to outsmart one another.

[Gjorgjevski] Was this, therefore, something like a conversation between deaf people?

[Timotej] Not quite. The reason was that the two commissions reached a very substantive agreement on "combined services." This issue was to be considered by the highest church authorities of the two churches, requiring their approval. In practical terms, it was a question of allowing priests of either church to worship jointly in Macedonian and Serbian churches. Actually, this was a de facto recognition of the MPC by the SPC. However, matters did not reach that far. Now, after the latest event, it is a question of whether it will be necessary to revise the resolution of the SPC Synod, which forbids coservice between the clergy of the two churches. Yet this study of the resolution was to be made in the immediate future.

The Churches Are Macedonian

[Gjorgjevski] What was their view concerning the "autonomous status" of the MPC?

[Timotej] It was a question of a union with the SPC in terms of limited autonomy. In its internal affairs the Macedonian Orthodox Church would enjoy complete freedom, but in terms of international representation the MPC would be practically nonexistent, for such functions would be performed by the SPC. However, to us this was unacceptable, and we referred to the canons of the Orthodox Church and the traditions and examples of the other orthodox churches, insisting on the status of being an autocephalic church, for we did not create a new church but restored the Ohrid Archbishopric as represented by the MPC.

[Gjorgjevski] Therefore, does the new resolution eliminate the status of "autonomy" on which the SPC had been insisting so far?

[Timotej] This is, above all, a violation of humanitarianism. They are denying us what they have already given us. The

1958 Resolution of the SPC Assembly stipulates that "with the present resolution the Macedonian parishes are separated in their own autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church and the SPC Statute no longer applies to them." The future discussions, which were planned for the next two meetings, thus become harder.

[Gjorgjevski] Recently the Serbian Church has also raised the question of Serbian churches and possessions in Macedonia. Are there such church possessions in our country?

[Timotej] In the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian Orthodox Church owns all the churches and monasteries and they are strictly Macedonian and no one else's. They were built by the people and in this case views such as "what matters is when they were built" do not apply. Should we lay a claim to all the churches that were erected during the time of King Samuil as our property, considering that at that time the Ohrid Archbishopric extended as far as Moldavia, so that we, as the restorers of the Archbishopric, would have a right to those sites? This would be unreasonable. Simply put, the MPC is unaware of Serbian monuments in Macedonia.

[Gjorgjevski] Are there presently any chances whatsoever for new discussions between the two churches?

[Timotej] I have already said that relations are now even more difficult. The resolution passed by the SPC Assembly must be abrogated. However, discussions are necessary. Now, as to whether there will be discussions or not will be decided by the MPC Synod.

[Box, p 4]

In the same way that differing views may exist in any organization, there are people in the SPC Assembly, which is the highest church body, who have a "romantic" view of the situation. Of late nationalism itself, which is increasing among all nations and especially among the Serbs, has led to the prevalence of a trend indicating a lesser feeling for reality among the leadership of the SPC. It is the "hard line," the so-called Justinian Wing that is prevailing.

Black Market, 'Weapons Cult' in Macedonia

93BA0434A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 19 Dec 92 p 12

[Article by Zoran Petrov: "Daddy, Buy Me a Kalashnikov!"]

[Text] *In terms of light infantry combat weapons that are being increasingly black-marketed in Macedonia, it becomes difficult to speak of the legendary cult and Balkan love of guns.*

As a whirlwind leading to many wars and clashes in the past, the Balkans are a macroenvironment with a specific culture and philosophy of life and existence in which weapons occupy an important status as a factor of a kind of security and guarantee of survival. It is precisely in this case that we can speak of the almost traditional love felt by the people in this area for weapons, or something resembling a weapons cult. Actually, among others, the "revolver and dagger" are

an intrinsic part of our historical and cultural heritage, and a folklorist has justifiably said that the word "pistol" is one of the words in the Macedonian popular language that has the largest number of synonyms.

In a period when yet another insane war is raging in the "rugged Balkans," weapons once again become topical and are considered one of the most profitable businesses. Normally, the method used for this very topical business is that of weapons black-marketeering, which in the course of this year has exceptionally increased in the Republic of Macedonia. Therefore, the question of armaments, ordnance, and equipment imported in the Republic makes quite touchy the question of whether the familiar love of weapons in our area has assumed the third most important position.

"Scorpio" Bombs and Radio Sets

During the year, the personnel of the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] have been able to plug 17 black-market channels for illegal moving of weapons into the Republic. Twenty-six cases of illegal transportation of and trade in weapons, munitions, and explosives were exposed, and 47 individuals have been charged with criminal acts. According to official MVR data, 56 automatic rifles (most frequently Chinese or Yugoslav versions of the Russian Kalashnikov), nine military rifles, one sniper rifle, 10 automatic Scorpio, Makarov, and Uzi automatic pistols, 94 pistols and revolvers (Crvena Zastava, Luger, Browning, Beretta, etc.), 4.7 kg of explosives, more than 25,000 shells of various calibers, 10 hand grenades, and other explosive devices have been confiscated from such individuals.

Police investigations indicate that it is a question of organized black-market channels that operate on a very synchronized basis in the procurement and marketing of such "goods" in Macedonia. Most frequently, such weapons are procured from Western Europe, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Albania and, after the breakdown of Yugoslavia, from the rich arsenals of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Serbia. Weapons procured from Western Europe and Croatia are most frequently transported on an organized basis via Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, and then illegally imported into the Republic. Naturally, the track is much shorter in the case of illegal imports from Albania or Serbia, for in addition to the official border crossings, the black marketeers make extensive use of illegal crossing points. Once they are in the country, such "articles" are sold through middlemen who, logically, earn a fee from each item they sell.

What is particularly indicative, as well as worrisome, is the fact that weapons most frequently end up in the western part of Macedonia. Actually, the highest number of identified individuals who dealt in black marketeering and illegal trafficking in weapons are citizens of Albanian origin. Nor is there any secret about the prices at which weapons are sold to the end user. Kalashnikovs, for example, go for between 2,000 and 2,500 German marks; Scorpions and Makarovs, between 1,500 and 2,000 marks; and pistols and revolvers, from 800 to 1,500 marks, depending on the model.

On the other hand, in the course of the year, in several organized actions or from citizens' reports, the police have confiscated 1,150 weapons from individuals without permits to own or carry arms. Adding to this the fact that, as a rule of thumb, the total number of weapons owned without a permit is higher than the detected violations by a factor ranging from three to five, we can have an idea of the availability of pistols and guns as part of the domestic inventory.

Multiplying Channels

Weapons are being procured from all sides. In 1990, for example, two channels of illegal imports were discovered; five were discovered last year, and this year 17 black-marketeering tracks were blocked. Whereas several years ago it was mainly semiautomatic pistols and an occasional gun that were imported, this year automatic weapons are most popular and most prized. As to light infantry weapons for specifically combat operations, it would be hard not to believe in the cult and Balkan love for implements of war. Included in this case are hand grenades, plastic explosives, primers, slow-burning fuses, radio sets, camouflage uniforms, gas masks, mobilization lists, pertinent propaganda publications, and, ordinarily, financial support (the Radolista case of last 15 June), something which, by association, leads to something else much bigger, such as, for example, the organization of paramilitary units.

Ignoring the various conjectures, the fact is that we are witnessing a drastically increased availability of weapons which could be easily procured in almost any bigger market in the Republic. According to the MVR, in addition to the overall security situation, this fact is influenced by the blossoming of the gray economy and the growth of criminality, as a result of which private "experts" and, of late, even ordinary citizens, are increasingly resorting to this type of preventive "self-defense." In turn, this is also related to the high risk of survival, as indicated by several settling of accounts with guns, and accidents.

Despite strict penalties (for example, ownership of an automatic weapon or explosives is considered a crime) it appears that we will have to become used to an increasing presence of weapons. Whether we wish it or not, as long as the war in the former Yugoslavia goes on, as long as there is a potential danger that it may spread to Kosovo and Macedonia, and as long as the national leaders, military commanders, and other makers of the familiar Balkan syndrome do not learn that all wars end at the conference table, we too, in today's peaceful Macedonia, shall be witnessing an invading and expanding arms trade. Apparently, it will take quite some time for those who easily spend 1,000 or 2,000 German marks for a bit of steel to realize that, essentially, it does not give them any security. Until then, the various suppliers, black marketeers, and adventurist crooks will be filling their pockets.

*** Medicinal Drug Crisis in Macedonia Discussed**

93BA0433A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in
Macedonian 19 Dec 92 p 11

[Interview with Trajce Mukaetov, general director of the Alkaloid pharmaceutical company, by Evica Kamberova; place and date not given: "We Are Not To Blame"]

[Text] *According to the head of Alkaloid, it is not that enterprise but the disorganization of the state that should be blamed for the medicinal drug crisis. The future lies in becoming part of one or several worldwide pharmaceutical systems.*

Usually, when it becomes a question of the crisis of availability of medicines, the name Alkaloid Corporation comes up very frequently as one of the main culprits for such a protracted crisis that is still unable to improve the market with drugs or help to improve the situation. At the same time, that factory is inevitably mentioned also when we want to boast of some of our achievements and demonstrate some of our advanced features. Trajce Mukaetov, the general director of that corporation, not considered by news circles as sympathetic to the media, discusses the position of Alkaloid in the Macedonian economy and the prospects and "culpability" in the crisis involving availability of medicines.

[Kamberova] For the past few years Alkaloid has no longer been viewed as a factory with a long reputation of being poorly organized and unprofitable. It is being said ever more clearly that it remains strong even during the present hard times for the Macedonian economy. Is this view accurate?

[Mukaetov] It is correct that Alkaloid Corporation is working well and profitably even under these difficult circumstances. For quite some time it has not been in debt and has not asked for any credit (it has even extended credit to other companies); raw material availability has been secured for a reasonable period of time, and the optimal amount of finished products has been stored. Workers' salaries are within the limits set by the law, and their range is closely tied to Alkaloid's significant investments and to the circumstances. I have spent my entire working life in Alkaloid, for which reason I disagree with that part of your question which hints at unprofitable work in the past. Alkaloid has always been well organized, with cycles of better or less good work, based on conditions at the time. However, I am pleased to note with satisfaction that today this is a company with a high level of work organization, a proper and continuing personnel training in accordance with global technological and marketing circumstances, and with functional adaptability.

Rules of the Game

[Kamberova] The present conditions in the state allow you to play the role of a monopoly. As the borders open, however, and as blockades are lifted...such a monopoly status may be lifted. Due you have an idea of the way you would function under such new conditions?

[Mukaetov] Today virtually all companies in the Republic are in a way monopolistic, the reason being that most of them have no competitors in their fields. In terms of medicines, Alkaloid sells only what it can be paid for. The fact that the production of medicines is something special, aimed at protecting the health of the citizens, and that one cannot sell drugs as one would other products, is a very sensitive matter. However, the business policy of the company is clear: Drugs are sold at prices ranging between 15 and 20 percent below those of the competition; finished products are stored sufficiently to satisfy the needs of the citizens, for a logical amount of time. However, we cannot give medicines away for free, which would lead to the complete and final elimination, above all, of the possibility of supplying the state with domestically produced medicines and, at the same time, it would entirely destroy Alkaloid. Specifically, today the pharmacies lack Alkaloid medicines which are paid for out of funds provided by the Health Foundation although such drugs are available in Alkaloid stores. If we were to supply them to the pharmacies without charge, they would be available for a while, after which they will disappear. The stores would be emptied, and there will be no funds for the purchasing of more raw materials and for updating the production process. Production would be wrecked, and this would furthermore lastingly dry out the source of supply of medicines to the state. Who dares assume such responsibility? If the state wants to have its own pharmaceutical industry, it knows the rules of the game, and nothing very new could be said in this area. Otherwise, following the opening of the borders and the market, Alkaloid would consider its future as one of becoming part of a single or several global pharmaceutical giants, as a result of which it would be able to accept the worldwide rules of the game.

[Kamberova] According to the old union laws, subsequent to the privatization of public assets, big enterprises such as yours will be privatized. The public, the trade unions, and some political parties are raising questions related to revising this type of privatization. What do you think about that?

[Mukaetov] What is allowed by the law has already been accomplished: Alkaloid has been privatized. Let me add something specific to that: In the past Alkaloid paid salaries that were significantly lower than they could have been, although conditions for higher wages existed. This lowered earnings and strengthened the material foundations of the company, which today we describe as strong. At the same time, a number of other companies paid out more than they earned. Today the draft law puts all of us under the same conditions. This is not proper: Those that "ate up" their substance and those that strengthened their material foundations (i.e., were good managers) were given an identical start. The new law should at least take good management into consideration.

Cooperation Concept

[Kamberova] Your work was analyzed by Coopers & Lybrand. How were you rated?

[Mukaetov] I was very pleased to read the conclusions of the audit by this worldwide specialized company, according to which Alkaloid is a modern, well organized, and materially strong company in accordance with Western economic criteria. The conclusion was that 1991 profits were on the level of worldwide pharmaceutical companies.

[Kamberova] You were also asked by Milan Panic, the current Yugoslav prime minister, who is also the owner of Galenika, to become part of that chain, as one of its factories. What arguments did you use to refuse this suggestion, and what is your assessment of the situation from the current viewpoint?

[Mukaetov] Discussions were held on cooperating and involving the Alkaloid Corporation in one of the following worldwide systems: Pfizer, from the United States, about which we expressed our complete reservation, and Hafslund Nykomed, from Norway, which made only a basic offer. Furthermore, so far, two work meetings have been scheduled with U.S. ICN, which to the best of our knowledge ranks 40th in the world's list of pharmaceutical companies and of which Galenika is a part. ICN was ready to "purchase" Alkaloid as well. We, however, submitted some conditions, such as guarantees of a secure market, the necessary development of new production programs and building of new capacities, guaranteeing the security of Alkaloid personnel, and a having precise knowledge of Alkaloid's role and place in the management of the ICN system. So far, the entire perception within our company and broader consultations do not lead us to favor a plunge into such an arrangement without reservations, particularly considering that, from the viewpoint of its present condition, Alkaloid does not even come close to resembling a company ready for sale. Our concept involves, above all, cooperation and partnership with a respective powerful worldwide company, for even in the past we had a number of years of successful cooperation with some 15 big worldwide pharmaceutical companies, most of them rated more highly than ICN. Establishing ties with that company would put the company's present relations into question.

Discussions Are Necessary

[Kamberova] Alkaloid has opened offices abroad. What was the reason for that?

[Mukaetov] Alkaloid is a company that has always gone beyond Macedonian market limits and still today must seek new markets abroad, so that the strong positions already held in some markets may be maintained. The company's strategy is to develop its own foreign trade network. Currently Alkaloid companies and offices are either already established or are in the stage of opening in Switzerland, Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia. They are supported by precise data justifying their operations. All of them are organized on the principle of profitability, but the greatest concern is that of recruiting strong personnel for commercial work, something which Alkaloid can accomplish.

[Kamberova] It is being said in health circles that the main reason for your survival is the frequent increase in the prices

of medicines, which are totally uncontrolled. Is this the formula for your success and, in general, what are your views on improving the situation on the drug market?

[Mukaetov] I can responsibly assert that in the matter of drug price increases this is inaccurate. The percentage of increase in the prices of pharmaceuticals is much lower than that compared to other producers. Alkaloid is regularly mentioned among the culprits for the poor supply with medicines. My view, however, is that this is being said in order to conceal other weaknesses. Alkaloid has needed and continues to need better supplies. Naturally, one must sit down and discuss matters with us. For quite some time, Alkaloid has not had the opportunity to hold such a discussion, which has been steadily postponed. I claim that it is only through Alkaloid that the state can be supplied with drugs most regularly, of the highest quality, and at the lowest possible price. Otherwise, the formula for success of our factory should be sought in the 57-year-old tradition, its modern organization, high production quality, and consequent market management....

Extent of Efficiency

[Kamberova] It is being said that recently, on your instructions, some 10 factory directors have been replaced. Did you take this step for the sake of efficiency or because of their poor work?

[Mukaetov] In the past few years, increasing changes have been made with the sole view of upgrading and ensuring a high degree of work efficiency. Every manager has his clearly formulated planned assignments that are quantified, which means that they are clearly defined in terms of business policies. Anyone in charge of a function must meet his quota. Failure to implement the quarterly assignments automatically means loss of managerial function. This equally applies to the general director. Other rules exist as well, which are being strictly applied. In Alkaloid, one of the more important ones is that one cannot hold a managerial function and, at the same time, be the owner of a private company. When the rules of the game are clear, all one needs is their strict application and the setting of a positive personal example.

[Kamberova] What are the development prospects of Alkaloid?

[Mukaetov] In 1992 alone the Alkaloid Institute put on the market 21 pharmaceuticals, which include hemodialysis solutions. We believe that this is an obvious contribution to Macedonia's economic independence. On that level, the tasks of Alkaloid for the forthcoming period are even more ambitious. In addition to medicines for people, its program includes the production of veterinary goods, chemicals, wood and metal protective chemicals, X-ray films and reproduction materials, means of personal hygiene, vegetal-based products, and seasonings, and it is slowly entering the area of food production.

Vojvodina

* 'Three-Tiered Autonomy' in Vojvodina Urged
 93BA0447A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in
 Hungarian 21 Dec 92 p 3

[Unattributed interview with Antal Balint, a leader of the Senta branch of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Vojvodina; place and date not given: "Only Victory Can Help"]

[Excerpt] *One is not allowed to pronounce the name of the city of Zenta [Senta] in Vojvodina as "Zenta," even in Hungarian. Conforming to the Serbian loan translation, it must be called "Szenta" [Hungarian spelling to indicate that the word must be pronounced "Senta"]. The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Vojvodina (VMDK) changed this decision, as they changed many others; they try to improve the lot of the Hungarians living in Bacska [Backa] and Banat. We spoke about this with Antal Balint, a leader of one of the Zenta branches of the VMDK.*

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] Eighty-five percent of the population of this town of 20,000 are native speakers of Hungarian. It is important to stress this because there are municipalities in Vojvodina where Hungarians are a negligible minority. Although supposedly everyone manipulates census statistics according to his own interests....

[Balint] Let us look at the register of the Roman Catholic Church. According to this, 380,000 Catholics live in Vojvodina. Incidentally, a considerable number of Calvinists live in South Banat, as well. Moreover, many declared themselves earlier as Yugoslavs, because of "mixed" marriages. And they did that in spite of the fact that they were native speakers of Hungarian! In the course of the census, one had to answer the question "What is your mother tongue?" But these data are being kept secret.... We have concrete proof that many people don't dare call themselves Hungarian. For instance, because people in villages were threatened that their property, their real estate would be confiscated. It is a

fact that in every previous census, the number of Hungarians in Vojvodina decreased by 10-15 percent, which is obviously not true....

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] Since the VMDK won the elections in May, the Serbian leaders were replaced by Hungarians. Are the people still afraid?

[Balint] Unfortunately, we are exercising self-government only for show. The members of the executive committee are from among us, but we were not able to change the entire administration; the greater part of the old staff remained in place. The only thing that could help were if we won again in the present elections (at the time of the interview the results were not yet known—the editor), and then, with the added help of the Western powers, we could finally attain the three-tiered Hungarian autonomy.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] Let us suppose that the three-tiered autonomy will solve the problems of the Hungarian minority. Do you think this dream can be realized in this region?

[Balint] I am hopeful because this model is not only good for us, but also for the Ruthenians, Romanians, Albanians, Slovaks, and the rest who live in Vojvodina. And as far as the international opinion of the problem is concerned, both Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance support our plan. I think that it will be the Serbs of all people who will manage to attain the realization of the dream for us, as well. After all, for the minorities living in Bosnia, this is the maximum they can achieve.... You must know that there were Russians in Russia who kept saying, "where we live is also Russia!" And then, willy-nilly they had to face the reality that they were left on the outside—22 million of them! Well, they are not at all dejected. On the contrary, they immediately started to fight for autonomy.... In my opinion, a normal person cannot say that "there should be a Great Serbia, and all Serbs should live there." Just as the Croats, Romanians, Albanians, Slovaks, and Hungarians cannot say that it is Croatia, Romania, Albania, and so on, where they live. It is precisely such nonsense that puts weapons into people's hands; this is how half of Europe can be exterminated! Please, write it down once again: Every ethnic minority would be granted autonomy in this region, in the same way as we would. [passage omitted]

NTIS
ATTN PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD VA

2

22161

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

|||||||||||||||||

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, military, economic, environmental, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available sources. It should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed. Except for excluding certain diacritics, FBIS renders personal names and place-names in accordance with the romanization systems approved for U.S. Government publications by the U.S. Board of Geographic Names.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Central Eurasia, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.